By Dennis Ross and and David H. Petraeus
Dennis Ross, a fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East policy, was special assistant to President Obama for the Middle East
and South Asia from 2009 to 2011. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who retired from the
Army in 2011 after commanding U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan, was director of the CIA from September 2011 to November 2012.
Many
members of Congress continue to grapple with the nuclear deal with Iran — and
so do we. Like us, the undecideds see its benefits: The deal would block the
uranium enrichment, plutonium separation and covert paths to a nuclear bomb for
the next 15 years. Compared with today, with an Iran that is three months from
break-out capability and with a stockpile of 10 bombs’ worth of low-enriched
uranium, there can be little doubt that a deal leaves us far better off ,
producing a one-year break-out time and permitting the Iranians less than one
bomb’s worth of material for the next 15 years . We also don’t believe that if
Congress blocks the deal, a better one is going to be negotiated. Will the
other members of the P5+1 be ready to return to the table because Congress says
no? Will they even know who defines the U.S. position and what it is? We doubt
it.
So
if the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
has clear benefits and there is no obvious negotiated alternative , why are we
still undecided? Put simply, because the deal places no limits on how much the
Iranians can build or expand their nuclear infrastructure after 15 years. Even
the monitoring provisions that would continue beyond 15 years may prove
insufficient as the Iranian nuclear program grows. And Iran’s ability to
dramatically increase its output of enriched material after year 15 would be
significant, as Iran deploys five advanced models of centrifuges starting in
year 10 of the agreement.
In terms of the size of
its nuclear program, Iran will be treated like Japan or the Netherlands — but
Iran is not Japan or the Netherlands when it comes to its behavior. It is,
after all, one of three countries designated by the United States as a state
sponsor of terrorism. Perhaps in 15 years we will see a very
different Iran — not a sponsor of terrorism, not a threat to its neighbors, not
led by those who declare that Israel, another U.N.-member state, should be
eliminated. But, while we hope that Iran may change, we cannot count on it.
The fact that President
Obama emphasizes that the plan depends on verification — not trust — also means
that he is not assuming Iran will change. But verification means only that we
can catch the Iranians if they cheat; what matters even more is that the
Iranians recognize that they will pay a meaningful price when we catch them.
In
other words, deterrence is the key to ensuring not just that the Iranians live
up to the agreement but also to preventing them from developing nuclear
weapons. Iran must know that we will not permit it to become a nuclear weapons
state ever.
Now is the time to make
it clear that there will be a firewall between Iran’s threshold status and its
having a nuclear weapon. Now is the time for the Iranians and the world to know
that if Iran dashes toward a weapon , especially after year 15, that it will
trigger the use of force. At that point, it would be too late for sanctions to
preempt an Iranian nuclear fait accompli.
It is critically
important for the president to state this clearly, particularly given his
perceived hesitancy to use force. Indeed, were Obama to be unequivocal about
the use of force should Iran violate its commitment not to seek nuclear
weapons, the international community would accept the legitimacy of military
strikes in response.
In a letter to Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.),
Obama takes account of the importance of deterring Iran “from ever obtaining a
nuclear weapon.” Even more significantly, he says that his administration “will
take whatever means are necessary . . . including
military means” to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. That is an
important statement, but it is followed by devaluing language: “Should Iran
seek to dash toward a nuclear weapon, all of the options available to the
United States — including the military option — will remain available through
the life of the deal and beyond.”
Surely if the Iranians
are dashing toward a weapon, especially after year 15, there is a need not to
speak of our options but of our readiness to use force. The threat of force is
far more likely to deter the Iranians.
The Iranians also should
know that if they produce highly enriched uranium — for which there is no legitimate
civilian purpose — that we would see that as an intention to make a weapon and
would act accordingly. There is no mention of highly enriched uranium in the
president’s letter. Although Obama speaks in the letter of providing the
Israelis with the BLU-113, a 4,400-pound “bunker buster” bomb,
it would not be sufficient to penetrate Fordow, the Iranian enrichment site
built into a mountain. For that, the Israelis would need the 30,000-pound massive ordnance penetrator (MOP)
and the means to carry it. While some may question whether we would act
militarily if the Iranians were to dash to a bomb, no one questions whether the
Israelis would do so.
Bolstering
deterrence is essential in addressing key vulnerabilities we see in the deal. A
blunter statement on the consequences of Iran moving toward a weapon and of
producing highly enriched uranium would allay some of our concerns. Providing
the Israelis the MOP and the means to carry it would surely enhance deterrence
— and so would developing options now in advance with the Israelis and key Arab
partners to counter Iran’s likely surge of support for Hezbollah and other
Shiite militias after it gets sanctions relief.
Deterrence would be more
effective — and full implementation of the agreement more likely — if the
Iranians understand that there will be a price for every transgression, no
matter how small, and that we will raise the cost to them of de-stabilizing
behavior in the region. The president’s letter to Nadler was useful but fell
short of addressing our concerns. It is still possible for the administration
to do so.
