BESA
Center Perspective Papers No. 303
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Vienna agreement has made the situation
more complex and dangerous, not less so. In the best of all circumstances, Iran
will abide by the terms of the JCPOA, and when restrictions and sanctions come
to an end fifteen years hence – emerge much stronger, militarily and
economically. This situation will almost assuredly lead to the use of force
against Iran, because Iran undoubtedly will try to produce nuclear weapons; be
much better able to withstand foreign pressures; and hold significant sway
across the Middle East. The conflict that will ensue will take place in
conditions far worse (from a Western perspective) than before the agreement,
pitting the West (and/or Israel) against a much-stronger Iran.
The
agreement with Iran reached by the Western powers represents, ostensibly, a
great achievement. If the Iranians abide by its terms, their ability to achieve
nuclear weapons status will be set back by around fifteen years (although it
could be claimed that part of the agreement is valid for only ten years).
Furthermore, the strict inspection arrangements are meant to ensure that even
if Iran does not observe the agreement, IAEA inspectors will be able to spot
any violations, and there will be plenty of time (a year) to formulate a response.
However,
this would be to ignore the central problem that arises from the agreement and
from a series of inherent weaknesses in the accord. It is clear that the
agreement was signed in order to delay the Iranian nuclear bomb program, not to
end it. And thus, when the program rears its head again it will be a problem
several times more serious and far harder to deal with.
There is
no cause for hysteria. The agreement will not bring about Israel’s downfall,
and in the best case scenario may even buy Israel some time to better prepare
for confronting the Iranian challenge. Nevertheless, the map of reality should
be read correctly, and not through rose-tinted glasses. The reality facing
Israel following the signing of the agreement is significantly more threatening
than before.
The main
problem is with the substantial outcome of the agreement, which was well
described by Iranian President Rouhani, as follows: Iran gets to keep its
(military!) nuclear program, while sanctions against Iran are lifted. For the
Iranians it was important, above all else, to gain international legitimacy for
their nuclear program, and in this they have been successful.
As a
basis for discussion it is important to emphasize that the Iranian nuclear
program has no civilian element, and no justification other than as a military
program. This is the consensus of all the international experts, some of whom
will only say so privately, but most of whom are explicit in this. There is no
serious expert who thinks that Iran is developing its capabilities for civilian
purposes.
On the basis of this
understanding, which was accepted by the American experts as well, American
policy was initially clear: the agreement should dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities. This was the
term used by the Americans themselves. But at some stage the US decided to move
from a policy aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear capability, to a policy aimed
at delaying Iran’s ability to achieve nuclear weapons by ten to fifteen years.
There are
several components to the American solution:
a. A
significant slow-down of the enrichment program, involving shutting down almost
half of Iran’s centrifuges. (There are currently around 9,000 centrifuges
active; after the agreement there will be just over 5,000). Furthermore, almost
all the enriched material will be transferred out of Iran. Iran will continue
enrichment, but will no longer have a stock of enriched material, which is a
necessary condition for producing weapons.
b.
Throughout the period covered by the agreement, Iran will not build a core for
the production of plutonium. Construction had begun on such a core as it will
now be modified so that it will not be capable of producing plutonium.
c. A
strict inspections regime will be put in place to prevent Iran from cheating
and hiding violations of the agreement.
From the
moment that the policy in Washington changed, and there was no longer any
intention of actually dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities, it was clear to
the Americans that it would be impossible to include Israel in the
negotiations. The US therefore shifted to conducting secret negotiations that
it hid from Israel.
While the
importance of personal relations should not be underestimated, this US decision
to keep the details of the negotiations with Iran from Israel stemmed from the
fundamental understanding that, following the shift in American policy, Israel
would not be able to agree with the purpose of the negotiations, nor in any
case involved in an active capacity.
As long
as the purpose of the negotiations was shared and agreed-upon, Israel went
along with the US, and did nothing that might upset the process. As soon as the
US decided to make do with delaying Iran’s getting the bomb, by a fixed time
period, then Israel was left on the outside – not because of the strained
relations between the president and the prime minister, but because of
significant differences of opinion. Subsequently, although the American
negotiators did make use of Israeli experts, Israel was not involved in the
central deliberations.
What
happens next? Although the struggle in Congress has yet to be concluded and for
the purposes of this paper, I assume that the president will use his veto to
uphold the agreement even without the consent of Congress. I also assume that
the Americans will seriously monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement.
What are
Iran’s options? This is an important question, the answer to which will be the
most influential factor on Israel’s course of action and responses.
It should
be emphasized that, in any case, Israel must maintain its freedom of choice.
The fact that the powers signed an agreement must not be allowed to paralyze
Israel. The country’s security is at stake, and on this issue we should take
the advice of the current President of the US: “Israel must be able to defend
itself, by itself,” even if the agreement makes this a more complex proposal.
It should
be assumed that whichever course Iran chooses, it will be very conscientious
about keeping to the requirements of the agreement during the early stages of
its implementation (a year or two, at least). Iran may try, during this period,
here and there to erode the understandings regarding inspections, but it will
not try to cheat and to crudely contravene the agreed rules.
During
this period Iran’s supreme interest will be the lifting of sanctions. Around
60% of the agreement deals with the lifting of sanctions and the dismantling of
the mechanisms used to enforce them. The removal of sanctions will allow Iran
to rebuild and significantly strengthen its economy as billions will flow into
Iran, even though a proportion will be lost to the dark abyss of entrenched
Iranian corruption.
This step
will also allow the regime to trumpet its achievements, and to strengthen its
position versus those Iranians who are more inclined toward freedom and
democracy. (Whether the main beneficiaries will the fundamentalists, who will
claim that stubbornness has been rewarded, or the less hardline factions, who
will point to the benefits of displaying tactical flexibility, it is impossible
to say.)
The
lifting of sanctions will also serve to release a great amount of Iran’s energy
and money which can be redirected toward furthering its interests in the Middle
East and beyond. Here, the beneficiaries will be Iran’s allies – Hezbollah,
Hamas, the Alawites in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. For all these reasons
it can be expected that, initially, Iran’s efforts will be invested in removing
the burden of sanctions and becoming stronger, both internally and externally.
After this
initial period of several years or so, there are three possible directions in
which events may develop:
A first scenario involves
the possibility that the agreement will drive regime change in Tehran, or at
least a change in the behavior of the current Islamic regime.
This
scenario posits that in a decade from now the West will no longer have anything
or anyone to fear in Iran, because moderate forces will have taken power, and
Iran’s policies in terms of terror, relations with Israel, intervention in other
states, and more, will be less aggressive and more moderate.
This
perspective on the agreement – that it can and might succeed in changing the
nature or behavior of the Iranian regime – is very powerful. It offers hope,
which is a highly attractive perspective for all human beings, world leaders
included.
This was
the main theme of the speech given by the European Union’s foreign policy
commissioner at the signing of the agreement, and it would appear that this
belief is shared by many members of the establishment in Europe. It would not
surprise me to learn that US decision makers too do not feel that they were
“defeated” by their Iranian counterparts in the negotiations, but that they
truly believe that this compromise with tyrants was the right course in order
to bring about a better world. The agreement, they may have convinced
themselves, will change the paths taken by Iranian dictators, and at the very
least will do more to prevent threats to peace than the use of military force.
This is
not mere naivety; it is a deep-rooted ideological perspective. This was also
the accepted approach taken during the Cold War, when many thought that the
very existence of an agreement with the USSR was more important than its
content; because of the power of signing an agreement to refresh and improve
relations between the two hemispheres. There were even those who claimed that
simply meeting to negotiate, and recognizing the existence of the other’s
claims, could open possibilities to a better world.
Before
they changed their policy, the Americans stated that this was not the line of
thinking that was guiding them in these negotiations, as they held no
expectation of a change in the behavior of the regime following the agreement.
Even today many in Washington would agree that such a hope would be baseless.
This approach appears completely unrealistic and particularly unsuited to Iran,
as it has revealed itself to observers of the Islamic revolution. But still
some very important decision makers seem really motivated by that optimistic
approach.
We can
hope and pray that the optimists are right, but the probabilities seem stacked
against them. This approach did not meet with success in Munich in 1938, or in
the case of North Korea, or in the initial efforts of the Obama administration
towards Russia. In truth, I am not aware of a single case in modern history in
which this purported dynamic proved successful (despite the claims made with
regard to the Nixon-China case).
A second scenario is that
within a few years, the Iranians will feel sufficiently strengthened and will
begin to cheat; initially on peripheral issues, and then as they gain
confidence, on more substantial issues. In this context, the agreement will
lead to two changes, one positive, and the second negative.
The
positive achievement rests on the American promise that the inspections regime
will be extremely strict, that inspections will deploy advanced technology so
that infractions will be detected in close to real time, and that the American
response to infractions will be swift and forceful. (This latter part has not
been said explicitly, but is implied by the administration’s promises).
Regardless
of any illogical American concession during surprise inspections of
non-declared sites, I assume there will be strict oversight provided by the
experts of the IAEA. These experts will work towards the best of their
capabilities. However there is no question that concessions made by the P5+1 in
the final days of the negotiations harmed these capabilities.
At the
same time, it is important to be aware that the level of intelligence provided
by the P5+1 and mainly the Americans will inevitably decline over time. It will
not be felt immediately, because at the beginning all parties will take care to
ensure a high level of intelligence gathering. But over time, as other problems
arise elsewhere in the world, the quality of intelligence about Iran will
deteriorate. There will be two unavoidable reasons for this:
a. Priority. Even the mighty US needs
to set priorities for the use of resources. After a while, once it is seen that
Iran is indeed keeping to the agreement, there will naturally be a slow but
steady transferal of intelligence resources to other burning problems.
b. Level of operational risk. Against
a state with which there is a signed agreement, intelligence operations are
conducted at a lower level of risk. A complicated operation that, if
discovered, might embarrass the US will be authorized for a hostile, dangerous
state, but not for one with which a signed agreement exists. There may of
course be states which find it less difficult to operate against states with
which they have an agreement, but American efforts will certainly be affected
by the new circumstances after the agreement.
Because
of these two reasons, it is clear that over a period of several years the
quantity and quality of intelligence will be reduced. This process is familiar
in Israel from similar cases in the past, and there is no reason to think that
there will be any difference for American intelligence vis-à-vis Iran. The
result will be potentially disastrous for the agreement.
It is
clear that Iranian cheating will not take place at the declared facilities
which are under IAEA inspection, but at sites unfamiliar to the international
community, whose location can only be discovered through gathering high-quality
intelligence. The combination of the American concession on surprise
inspections of such sites, and the inevitable decline in intelligence quality,
offers an excellent foundation for successful Iranian cheating.
The
ability to leverage American (and other) intelligence about Iran will also
necessarily be eroded. The US will be unwilling to disclose its
intelligence-gathering capabilities and methods, particularly those that would
indicate operational activity on the soil of its new partner, Iran.
The IAEA,
for its part, will be as unwilling as in the past to make use of external
intelligence (even when presented with it) in order to conduct non-agreed
inspections of sensitive facilities, out of fear of being accused of acting as
an agent of Israel or the US. Hence it will need to invest a great deal of time
and effort in order to build an independent dossier that will stand up to
scrutiny, which will be sufficient for it to conduct more confrontational
inspections at undeclared facilities. It is difficult to see how the IAEA might
develop such capabilities.
It also
appears that the claim, “a year will be sufficient in order to respond
appropriately,” is not sufficiently well-founded. It is clear that the interest
of any administration bound by the agreement, even if it inherits it, and
certainly if it identifies with it, will be to obscure any violations rather
than to recognize them, for as long as possible. Moreover, administrations do
not like to be put in the position of having to make difficult decisions, and
so in general if a situation is not entirely clear, but rather contains shades
of grey, the decision-makers (and even the intelligence agencies) tend to find
“explanations” in order to delay making a decision.
Thus, for
example, in 1995 Israel presented a great deal of high-quality, well-analyzed
intelligence information to the US, to show our friends in Washington that the
Iranian administration had begun a military nuclear program. The Americans took
the issue very seriously, and appointed a team headed by a senior official to
examine it. At the end of this process, this official let us know that we had
“failed completely in our efforts to create a new enemy.” He meant that the US
wasn’t about to identify Iran as a “new enemy” – despite Israel’s information –
after the US had tackled Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War. A further two
years passed before my successor was able to persuade the Americans that the Iranian
enemy was real and that its nuclear military program was dangerous.
It is not
difficult to imagine US intelligence staff presenting information about Iranian
violations and being rebuffed by decision-makers, using learned explanations.
This would continue until they provide the elusive “smoking gun,” or until it
is simply too late. In most similar cases intelligence services have needed
more than a year from the moment at which a violation begins in order to
identify it, understand it, and persuade the decision makers about it, and for
these to then decide and act.
Based on
the experiences in almost all similar cases in the past, it must be assumed
with a high degree of probability that if the Iranians make an effort to cheat
and to hide the evidence, it is almost certain that they will be able to
develop their first nuclear device before the West can respond.
A third scenario is the possibility that the Iranians will
abide by the agreement to the letter, all the way through to the end of its
10-15 year period. They will not cheat, but will use the time to expand their
knowledge and capabilities, in theory and in practice.
Thus, for
example, since Iran is allowed within certain limits to develop the next
generation of centrifuges, they will focus their efforts on that. In such a
scenario it is reasonable to assume that at the end of the period, after more
than a decade, that will have the expertise to produce centrifuges that are 10
or 20 times faster. This is a very realistic prospect, and seemingly would not
represent a violation of the agreement, as long as it is done with the
appropriate caution.
Since the
embargo on conventional weapons will be lifted after five years, the Iranians
will work to significantly improve their anti-aircraft defenses. They can
expect help from Russia, which needs the money to be gained from these
projects, which are defensive in nature and therefore “acceptable.” Three years
later the embargo on the Iranian missile project will also be lifted, and Iran
will make every effort to progress in its development and production of precise
missiles, particularly long-range ones that would allow it to threaten Europe
initially (at a very early stage), and later the US.
There is
little doubt that within ten years, and certainly once the embargo is lifted,
Iran will achieve these capabilities. It will be better protected from any
aerial threat, and able to carry out missile strikes on many areas of the
world.
In
parallel, determined efforts will be made to develop the Iranian economy so that,
after a decade, it will be able to withstand outside pressures. For example,
Iran will stockpile spare parts for sensitive systems, Iranian banks will hold
more foreign currency, and there will be more partnerships with large
international companies – making any future sanctions program more difficult.
In short,
all the lessons will be learned from the last sanctions regime, and Iran will
be better prepared for a similar situation in the future.
Clearly,
following a global rush to invest in Iran, involving both private and
government investors, the possibility of a return to a sanctions regime will be
significantly curtailed, as billions of dollars from the countries expected to
impose sanctions will be invested in Iran – and who would want to lose them?
But even if sanctions are resumed, they will have a greatly-reduced impact
against an Iran that would be far more ready to withstand them than in the
past.
Over the
course of these years, Iran will greatly strengthen its grip on the Middle
East. For example, it will solidify its control of Yemen, including developing
the capacity to block the Bab al-Mandab strait and thus threaten global trade
and the Suez Canal, Egypt’s lifeline. It will take complete control of Lebanon,
and with the help of other countries (perhaps even including the US, it will
“save” the region by fighting ISIS) to become the true ruler of Iraq and of
what would remain of Alawite Syria.
Hezbollah
will be given thousands of precise missiles, while enjoying Iranian backing and
apparent or perceived American approval (saving Lebanon from ISIS). Hamas
will receive more aid. And of course, Iran’s widespread terror network around
the globe (according to reports from the US State Department) will be more
active than ever, as an irritant and a deterrent. These organizations will feel
stronger being supported by the new regional superpower, Iran, and will thus be
less hesitant to act.
There is
little chance that America will follow through on its promise, that after
signing the agreement it will be more determined in its efforts to contain
Iran. US officials have repeatedly referred to this promise while defending the
agreement. But this promise is unrealistic and illogical.
Once a
rival state becomes a partner to an agreement, one does not increase efforts
taken against it in other realms. It is the nature of agreements that cover a
certain area of relations that they prevent pressure being applied in other
areas, rather than increasing pressure. No-one in the West will now be
interested in jeopardizing either the agreement or trade relations with Iran.
It is therefore likely that, despite the messages of reassurance coming from
Washington, Iran will become much stronger over those 15 years, internally,
regionally, economically, and militarily, with little opposition from the US.
Only
then, after 15 years of careful planning while observing all aspects of the
agreement, will Iran begin an accelerated process of building a bomb. How long
will it take then to identify and understand Iran’s actions? What tools will
the world, and the US in particular, possess to deal with a stronger Iran
following 15 years of development? How quickly will Iran have sufficient
enriched material? No-one has the answers to these questions.
In 2031,
then, the Iranian success in achieving the agreement signed in 2015 will come
to full fruition. Iran’s logic throughout the negotiations will then become
apparent, as in retrospect it will be seen that the country’s leaders gave up
on fulfilling the dream of a military nuclear program in their time, in order
to allow it to be achieved easily and with no real opposition less than twenty
years later.
Thus, a
year after the agreement expires, Iran assuredly will have a small number of
missiles capable of reaching the US, hundreds of missiles capable of reaching
large parts of Europe, thousands of followers willing and able to carry out
attacks anywhere in the Middle East, and, I suppose, at least two atomic bombs.
Who will be able to halt its march to regional domination? Who will be able to
prevent the fulfillment of the 1,300 year-old Shi’ite dream? Who will be able
to stop the representative of the Mahdi (the Shi’ite messianic figure) armed
with nuclear weapons?
Once the
agreement expires, Iran will be free to begin its rush to nuclear weapons,
legitimately, having abided by the agreement – but with its regime bolstered
and its dreams of expansion unchanged.
Several
states in the region view these last two scenarios as likely (and even
probable). They understand the danger of a Middle East threatened by an Iranian
nuclear umbrella; and even prior to that, the dangers presented by Iran’s
immediate strengthening due to the agreement. They are fearful, and so they
will prepare themselves.
The
practical outcome is that the Middle East will immediately enter a double arms
race. The Gulf States will spend a lot of money on American weapons that will
supposedly grant them increased security in the face of a more powerful Iran.
Clearly their competition with Iran as to who is the strongest will reach great
heights, as both the Russians and the Americans (and even France and Britain)
have an economic interest in selling as much weaponry as possible, and there is
no upper limit to the advances that money can buy.
This will
be the straightforward part of a new Mideast arms race. The more difficult
element in terms of international stability will come when at least three Sunni
countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, reach the decision that they cannot
afford to lag behind a Shi’ite power in developing nuclear weapons. The West
will have no moral right to prevent them from doing so, having allowed the dark
and cruel mullahs in Tehran a nuclear bomb.
These
countries will begin this process sometime after the agreement is in place,
once its shortcomings are clear, and will complete it very close to the
expiration of the agreement in 15 years’ time. This will be an entirely
different Middle East; very much a “New Middle East.” A very bad one.
In the
meantime, paradoxically, the agreement may actually contribute to the
strengthening of ISIS. The Sunnis have been engaged in a historical struggle
with the Shi’ites since the seventh century, and for some time have felt
threatened by the Iranian initiative that began with the 1979 revolution, and
by the Shi’ite dynamism led by Iran throughout the region. Thus, for example,
Iran is responsible for the deaths (by its own forces or by its various supported
factions) of Sunnis fighting for their lives in Syria. Shi’ites in Iraq
expelled the Sunnis from all positions of influence, and hurt them in every way
possible, while Iran supported the Shi’ite government in Baghdad. Iran is
leading the wars of Shi’ite minorities against a Sunni majority in Yemen and
against the Sunni leaders of Bahrain.
Following
the agreement, the Sunnis are liable to feel that the US has “taken sides” in
this historic battle. They will be able to claim, based on the visible evidence,
that the US did not fight against the “Shi’ite” Assad when he used poison gas
against Sunnis, but does fight against ISIS; and that the US ignores the
interests of Sunni states and signs an agreement with the Shi’ite symbol of
evil, Iran; and thus Sunnis must protect themselves.
Since
ISIS is currently viewed as the strongest organization around, representing
better than any others the Sunni interests in the region, this may make it
easier for it to recruit more fighters to its ranks, to help it stand against
the Shi’ite-American axis. A sign of such a process occurring will be if
smaller rebel groups in Syria join ISIS, or announce cooperation with it.
Ironically, should this happen, the West’s need for Iran to help stem the
growth of ISIS will be greater than ever, and thus a feedback loop will be
created.
Summary
It is
impossible to claim, in light of all the shortcomings of the agreement as
described above, that the agreement should be supported even if it is not
perfect. This agreement will likely and necessarily lead to the use of force
against Iran, at some stage or other, in order to halt its race toward nuclear
weapons. This, however, will take place in far worse conditions than before the
agreement, against a far-stronger Iran.
Those who
claimed that Israel should not act against Iran, as Iran is an international
problem that will be addressed by the US, made a huge mistake. The truth must
be told: This agreement has made the situation more complex and dangerous, not
less so.
The
administration claims that “this was the best agreement that could have be
achieved, and should therefore it should upheld.” But since the contents of the
discussions between the parties are not known, the only way for us to evaluate
the negotiations is by the results. For example: Some have asked why the US did
not include other issues, beyond the nuclear question, in the agreement, such
as a commitment from Iran to desist from involvement in international terror.
The American answer is that Washington did not want to include issues that
would complicate the negotiations, and that might even lead to additional
Iranian demands on nuclear issues in response. They therefore chose to stay
focused on Iran’s nuclear program.
This
answer does not hold up under scrutiny. At the very end of the negotiations,
Iran sought concessions on two non-nuclear issues: The removal of sanctions on
their missile program and on their conventional weapons build-up. In both
cases, Washington agreed to an Iranian demand that had no connection to the
nuclear issue. Sanctions on conventional weapons are to be lifted after five
years, and sanctions on missiles will be lifted after a further three years.
Thus Iran
was able to achieve non-nuclear concessions via the negotiations, while the US,
by its own admission, did not even try to do so. If no attempt is made to
improve vital issues during the negotiations, it is impossible to then claim
that this was the best possible agreement.
As to the
question, “Yes, but what is the alternative?” there is a clear answer. The
alternative was increasing the pressure of sanctions, conducting stubborn
negotiations, and making serious preparations for military action that would
crystalize all options on the table. Together, these would achieve a better
agreement.
The choice
was between a bad agreement, like the one achieved, and a far better agreement,
because the Iranians desperately needed to conclude a deal. Why the six powers
agreed to a bad agreement is an interesting historical question. In the
meantime, we are left to deal with its consequences, which for Israel (and in
my opinion for most of the world) are extremely serious.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror is the Greg
and Anne Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic
Studies, and former national security advisor to the Prime Minister. He is also
a fellow at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Strategy and Defense. He served 36
years in senior IDF posts, including commander of the Military Colleges,
military secretary to the Minister of Defense, director of the Intelligence
Analysis Division in Military Intelligence, and chief intelligence officer of
the Northern Command.
