Here’s why Obama will ignore Tehran’s
nuclear violations.
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Editorial
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Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn
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One obvious risk of a nuclear deal with Iran is that the
mullahs will pocket Western concessions even as they work on their atomic
capabilities in secret. That much was suggested this month by Gen.Michael
Flynn, the
former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who told Congress that “it
is prudent to conclude that there are elements of Iran’s nuclear program that
still remain hidden from view.”
But
here’s a less obvious risk: The U.S. might find evidence that Iran is cheating
but fail to act out of bureaucratic neglect—or a political desire to look the
other way.
That’s
the message of a report last month by the Government Accountability Office,
which found that the State Department had failed to provide timely reports to
Congress on the proliferation activities of Iran, North Korea and Syria.
Instead of delivering reports every six months, as required by law, delays
ranged from 22 months to three years.
GAO found
that State had failed to establish a basic process to meet its obligations
under the 2006 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. “Prolonged
delays in eventually imposing INKSNA sanctions could erode the credibility of
such threats and INKSNA’s utility as a tool in helping to curb weapons of mass
destruction proliferation,” GAO concluded. State knew of 23 people involved in
sanctions-busting activities in 2011 but only imposed sanctions last December.
That’s a long time to let bad guys run free, especially
when nuclear technology is at stake. Keep in mind that President Obama has
promised that any nuclear deal will provide a year’s warning should Iran cheat.
GAO
describes a Byzantine bureaucratic process, involving four “State-led
interagency working groups,” input from the intelligence community, further
input from the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce and the National
Security Council, a meeting of a “sub-Interagency Policy Committee,” further
review by relevant committees and eventual sign-off from the Deputy Secretary
of State. Amid that morass, the marvel is that anyone gets sanctioned.
As for
willful delay, GAO notes that “State officials told us that a variety of
political concerns, such as international negotiations and relations with
countries involved in transfers, can delay State’s INKSNA process.” That’s a
delicate way of admitting that the State Department is willing to obscure facts
to promote its arms-control agenda.
That
happened in 2010, when State failed to report Russia’s violations of the 1987
INF Treaty while the Administration was pressing the Senate to approve the New
Start nuclear treaty. More recently the Administration has played down Iran’s
failure to convert low-enriched uranium into oxide form, as required under the
interim 2013 deal. Secretary of State John
Kerry caved
again last week when he disclosed that the Administration is ready to lift
sanctions without a full accounting of Iran’s past nuclear work.
If this
experience is any guide, don’t expect the Administration to meet its
obligations under the recent Corker-Cardin bill on Iran, which requires the executive
branch to provide twice-yearly updates on Iran’s compliance with an agreement.
Arms
control is an obsession in which belief is inversely proportional to evidence
of success, and so it is with this Iran deal. How is
the U.S. supposed to enforce an Iran deal when the State Department would
rather cover up an adversary’s deceit than face the failure of U.S. diplomacy?
