Nuclear Negotiations At An Impasse:
Leader Khamenei Rejects Agreement Reached On Token Inspection Of Military Sites
And Questioning Of Scientists; U.S. Willing To Close IAEA Dossier On Iranian
PMD, To Settle For Inspecting Declared Nuclear Sites Only, And To Rely On
Intelligence; EU Objects
By: A. Savyon and Y.
Carmon*
Introduction
This past week,
members of Iran's nuclear negotiating team revealed details about the Iran-U.S.
nuclear negotiations. The negotiations were dealt a blow when Iranian Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei rejected an agreement reached by the two sides concerning a
token inspection of military facilities and questioning of several nuclear
scientists and "military personnel"; these were to be the response to
the IAEA's open dossier on possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear
program to which Iran has so far refused to respond.
Iranian reports on
these developments show that in order to arrive at a comprehensive agreement,
the U.S. is willing to forgo actual inspection of Iranian military facilities
and to settle for inspection of declared nuclear facilities only, as set forth
under the Additional Protocol, while the ongoing monitoring of Iran's nuclear
program will be left to intelligence elements.[1]
Thus, at this
stage, there is a deadlock: Iran is refusing both to respond to the IAEA
dossier on its PMD, and to allow actual inspection of facilities that are not
declared nuclear facilities.
Furthermore, the EU
has announced its objections to a comprehensive agreement with Iran in the absence
of satisfactory answers from it regarding the IAEA dossier on its PMD. It said
that the IAEA investigation of the PMD "will be essential" to a
nuclear deal.[2] IAEA Director-General Yukio Amano
has also linked the investigation of Iranian PMD to the attainment of such an
agreement.
The Issue: Inspection Of
Iranian Military Sites, Questioning Of Iranian Scientists
On May 25, 2015, in
an Iranian television interview, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and head
negotiator Abbas Araghchi disclosed that this issue had been agreed upon, but
that when the Iranian team returned to Tehran for Khamenei's approval, Khamenei
had rejected this agreed solution out of hand (see MEMRI TV Clip No. 4928, Top Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Abbas
Aragchi: We Reached Solution with P5+1 on Site Inspection, But Khamenei
Rejected It, May 25, 2015 and Appendix I).[3]
It was evident also
from Aragchi's statements that after Khamenei rejected the agreed solution,
Iran even reneged from what had been agreed as part of the Additional Protocol,
and is now insisting that limitations and restrictions that are part of the
Protocol be implemented in a way that will make future inspections difficult.
As part of Iran's backpedaling, Araghchi repeatedly emphasized that "so
far, nothing has been concluded" regarding the issue of the inspections.[4]
U.S. Willingness To Disregard
IAEA PMD Dossier
Statements by
negotiating team member Hamid Baidinejad show that in return for willingness on
Iran's part to sign a comprehensive agreement, the U.S. was willing to forgo
actual investigation of the IAEA's open PMD dossier on Iran and instead to
conduct a token inspection of military sites and questioning of Iranian nuclear
scientists and military personnel. The U.S. asked Iran to carry out a number of
specific steps, thereby paving the way to a comprehensive solution for this
issue. These steps included inspections at several points in Iran, including
two military facilities, and questioning several senior military officials and
scientists (see Appendix II).
Iranian Negotiators' Two
Versions Of Events
An analysis of
these statements by the Iranian negotiators shows that there are two different
versions of what took place in the negotiations. According to Araghchi, the
Iranian team agreed to the U.S.'s demand for a token inspection, but when the
team returned to Tehran, Khamenei completely rejected this token inspection.
Aragchi's disclosure that the Iranian negotiators had arrived at an agreement
with the Americans that was subsequently rejected by Khamenei caused an uproar
in the Iranian political system, triggering harsh criticism against both the
negotiators and the leaders of the pragmatic camp, and even leading to a public
confrontation between Khamenei and pragmatic camp leader Hashemi Rafsanjani.[5]
The second version
of events emerged after the uproar sparked by Aragchi's revelations. Another
negotiator, Baidinejad, in an attempt to correct Araghchi's claim, stated that
the Iranian negotiators had rejected the U.S. demands, even the demand for
token inspection, but that the Americans had pressed them to present the demand
to Khamenei anyway; when they did so, at the Americans' urging, Khamenei
rejected it outright.
Conclusion
Iran's reneging on
its consent to the U.S. demand for token inspections of its military facilities
and questioning of some of its scientists and military personnel in exchange
for the closing of the IAEA's PMD dossier on it places President Obama in a
difficult situation, and brings the negotiations to an impasse. This is because
along with Khamenei's rejection, the EU and the IAEA director-general both
oppose closing Iran's dossier in order to arrive at a comprehensive agreement.
It was apparently
under these circumstances that CIA director John Brennan was secretly
dispatched in early June to Israel, in order to persuade Israel, and, via
Israel, the EU, that intelligence monitoring of any Iranian PMD was a
satisfactory solution and that actual investigation of the PMD, which Khamenei
rejected, could be waived. To this end, Brennan also underlined, on May 31, 2015
on CBS's Face the Nation, the close U.S.-Israel security
cooperation.[6]
In light of this
situation, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said on May 31, 2015 that with
regard to inspection, "other solutions must be discussed."[7]
Appendix I: Aragchi's Version
Of Events
In an interview
that aired May 25, 2015 on Iran's Channel 2 TV,Araqchi said [8]: "[Our] red lines may change under
certain circumstances. This is another issue. We may change some of our red
lines for a certain period of time. This is not a problem. The [leader] will
give us new instructions, and the team will act accordingly. We have acted
within this framework, and we will do so in the future. We will not let
ourselves go beyond this framework...
"The
Additional Protocol, which is the internationally accepted [control] regime,
was not a red line for us. As I said before, our [negotiating] team does not
determine those red lines. From the very beginning - and given that the
Additional Protocol is [internationally] accepted – we were given permission to
accept it during the negotiations. So far, it has not been accepted – we do not
have an agreement yet - but it is one of the issues that the negotiating team
has been given instructions to accept. As I said, the red lines may or may not
be changed in due course, and the Additional Protocol may or may not be
accepted at some point, but so far, this has not happened, and our instructions
have not changed...
"If the
military officials, the relevant officials, the Iranian parliament or the
council appointed by Khamenei reach the conclusion that the access provided for
in the Additional Protocol comes under the same category as the inspections
that Khamenei banned, we will obey and will categorically not allow 'managed
access...'
"The 'Possible
Military Dimension' [PMD] has always been a strong pretext for the [West]. We
have to take this pretext away from them. We have created conditions that will
enable us, within the framework of reaching the final nuclear agreement, to
resolve the issue of PMD. This is possible now. In the negotiations, we
discussed and reached several possible solutions, but these were not accepted
in Tehran. These include [allowing the IAEA] to interview several [nuclear
scientists], and allowing access to several facilities. They gave us a list and
said: 'If you let us have access to these people and these facilities, we will
end the issue of PMD.' This, however, was not accepted by Tehran, and Khamenei
decisively and courageously rejected it.."
Appendix II: Baidinejad's
Version Of Events
In June 1, 2015
statements on his Instagram account that were quoted by the Iranian news agency
Fars, negotiating team member Hamid Baidinejad said:[9] "One of the first principles
agreed upon, already at the start of the Iran-P5+1 negotiations, was that in a
future nuclear agreement, Iran would implement the Additional Protocol on a
temporary and voluntary basis until the Majlis decides whether to ratify it and
takes into account the other side's implementation of its obligations…
"It is natural
that after a comprehensive nuclear agreement is signed, Iran would be expected
to revert to its previous decision – that is, temporarily and voluntarily
implementing the Additional Protocol... Without the implementation of the
Additional Protocol, even if it is on a temporary basis, the IAEA will not be
able to confirm that Iran's nuclear program is civilian, and that would mean
that the process for resolving the nuclear issue will have failed...
"In no way
does the Additional Protocol include a clause regarding an obligation on the
part of the member states to agree to inspection of their military facilities
or investigation of their nuclear scientists. The only thing that the
Additional Protocol does make possible is controlled access to non-nuclear
facilities, for taking [soil] samples for proving that there is no nuclear
activity at facilities that are not declared [to be nuclear sites]...
"Should there
be evidence of nuclear material at undeclared sites, whether they are military
or civilian, the IAEA will be able to demand controlled access to them [but]
only by means of a specific procedure already set out, so that an [Additional
Protocol] member state will agree to the sampling in order to prove that it is
not conducting nuclear activity in undeclared facilities...
"The
Additional Protocol is not a special agreement between the international
community and Iran; it is an important international document. Over 120 states
are currently members of this protocol, and some have signed it and implemented
it temporarily. Therefore, the attempt to interpret it in a way that will
include an obligation on the part of [member]states to undergo inspection at
[their] military facilities or to allow investigation of [their] nuclear
scientists is completely mistaken...
"The
discussion on the issue of [Iran's] PMD, [that is,] Western countries' claim
that Iran has a military nuclear program for producing nuclear weapons, is
historically rooted in the years prior to 2003. In recent years, U.S. and
Western intelligence services have said that before 2003, Iran's military wing
– commanded by specific commanders in the country – engaged in an extensive
clandestine project for producing nuclear weapons. To prove their mistaken
claim, [the West] presented intelligence based on their intelligence agencies;
however, Iran considers all this intelligence [data] to be faked... There is no
doubt that these false accusations against Iran can only be resolved with a
political agreement. Discussion of this issue, no matter how lengthy, will not
remove these accusations...
"[That is why]
the Iranian negotiating team proposed during the talks that Iran and the P5+1
resolve this issue, because they [i.e. the P5+1] would like, along with
reaching an agreement, that the issue of the accusations [that Iran] attempted
to obtain nuclear weapons will be resolved. They proposed that Iran take
several specific steps and thus pave the way to a comprehensive solution to the
issue... Iran announced that it considers this dossier faked... But an
agreement on it depends on what steps Iran will be asked to take [in order to
close the dossier]. They announced that they will discuss the issue on level of
the P5+1 [alone] because of its special sensitivity, and will submit their
final opinion to Iran at the appropriate time.
"In the round
[of talks] that preceded the [April 2015] press release in Lausanne, the P5+1
countries presented Iran with a program that includes inspection at a few
points, including two military facilities, and questioning of several senior
military officials and nuclear experts whose names were noted in the IAEA
reports both directly and indirectly. They claimed that [if they] were allowed
access to these sites, and the IAEA was permitted to question these people,
that would be the end of the matter of the [PMD] accusations against Iran. As
soon as this insulting proposal was raised, Iran rejected it unequivocally...
At the same time, the P5+1 asked the Iranian representatives to present the
P5+1's opinion to officials in Iran, despite their express opposition, [for the
officials' approval].
"Leader
[Khamenei's] harsh response rejecting the demand by these countries to inspect
military facilities and question nuclear scientists was a completely correct
and accurate response. The nuclear negotiations team is proud of having
expressed the exact same position [as Khamenei] three months ago, thanks to its
complete grasp of the position of the regime and of the leader... Unfortunately,
there were some in Iran who were not updated on the details of this issue...
and instead of praising the Iranian negotiating team, took the opportunity,
while being unaware of the process by which the issue was brought up for
discussion – which was reported in full to top regime officials – to launch
extremely harsh attacks on the Iranian negotiating team, to plan protests, and
to demand a halt to the negotiations...
"These
objections and accusations will not last long, but airing these concerns to public
opinion can cast doubt on the regime's main institutions. Everyone is expected
to understand Iran's critical circumstances, and, in this Year of Empathy
Between the Government and the People they must join hands in defending Iran's
basic principles and rights and must unite with senior officials in order to
efficiently promote the sensitive stage of the nuclear negotiations under the
guidance of top senior officials in the regime of the Islamic Republic – and
especially by Leader [Khamenei] who is very closely overseeing the
negotiations. This way, if an agreement is reached, it will guarantee the
preservation of the great Iranian nation's basic principles."
* A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iranian Media Project;
Y. Carmon is President and Founder of MEMRI.
Endnotes:
[1] Under the Additional Protocol, the clarification of
PMDs at facilities that are not declared nuclear facilities is subject to the
consent of the member state under investigation; thus, such sites in fact
cannot be inspected.
[3] In the interview, Aragchi said that the NPT's
Additional Protocol was not a red line for the Iranian team, and that the team
had in fact beeninstructed to accept it. He explained that Iran could always
harden its position on these issues. See MEMRI TV Clip No. 4928, "Top Iranian Nuclear Negotiator
Abbas Araqchi: We Reached Solution with P5+1 on Site Inspection, But Khamenei
Rejected It," May 25, 2015. It should be mentioned that under
former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, IAEA questioning of Iranian
scientists was permitted, and two visits to the Parchin military facility were
allowed. The Iranian team's acceptance of this demand by the international
community was presumably based on this precedent.
[5] Senior figures in Iran's ideological camp hastened
to obscure Araghchi's statements, and to correct them. Majlis speaker for
national security affairs Alaa Al-Boroujerdi stated that Aragchi's words were
untrue, and added: "Aragchi only discussed the major issues, and did not
say that Iran had consented to inspection of military facilities... Khamenei
announced that we will not allow any talks with Iranian scientists, after he
noticed that we were under threat by terrorists. The arrest of several who
murdered our nuclear scientists revealed that these [perpetrators] were linked
to the Mossad. We have red lines, and we will implement them. ISNA, Iran, May
25, 2015. The Javan daily, which is
affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also denied
Aragchi's statements regarding the red lines: "In a television interview,
top Iranian negotiation [Aragchi] referred to a particular point, and this
issue should be addressed. He said: '...Perhaps under certain conditions our
red lines will change, and the work [of the negotiations] will proceed
according to instructions.' This declaration regarding the possibility of
changes to the red lines under certain circumstances is mistaken, for several
reasons... As is evident from their names, the red lines are borders that
define the basic framework of the negotiations, and without them the
negotiations will reach undesirable and unexpected results." Javanalso warned the Iranian negotiating team about
deviating from the red lines: "The Iranian nation supports its negotiating
team as long as it operates to realize its rights in the framework of the
national interests and preserves national honor. Any withdrawal from this
basis, and acceptance of being forced into humiliation by the enemy side, will
be met with a popular response from the nation, and will undoubtedly go down in
history as a dark and negative point." Javan, Iran,
May 26, 2015. A new website affiliated with the extremist ideological camp
called on May 26, 2015 on Khamenei to fire Foreign Minister Zarif and his
negotiating team for their "American tendencies." Amanpress.ir, May
26, 2015.
[8] See MEMRI TV Clip No. 4928, Top Iranian
Nuclear Negotiator Abbas Aragchi: We Reached Solution with P5+1 on Site
Inspection, But Khamenei Rejected It, May 25, 2015.
[9] Fars (Iran),
June 1, 2015.
***
I have no words to describe the behavior of the West, but this television series shows that Europe was as spineless 77 years ago:
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I have no words to describe the behavior of the West, but this television series shows that Europe was as spineless 77 years ago:
