Yuval Steinitz |
JERUSALEM — Clearly unsatisfied with assurances from
Washington, Israel on
Monday listed specific requirements that it said it wanted in any final deal
with Iran over
that country’s nuclear program.
Whereas Israel’s
public diplomacy has so far focused on what many have said was an unrealistic
demand for the complete dismantlement of Iran’s potentially military nuclear
infrastructure, Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister of intelligence and strategic
affairs, presented a list of desired modifications for the final agreement due
to be concluded by June 30, that he said would make it “more reasonable.”
Those changes,
the Israeli government says, are necessary to close dangerous loopholes in the
preliminary framework agreed between Iran and world powers including the United
States in Lausanne, Switzerland, last week.
The Israeli list
includes:
• An end to all
research and development activity on advanced centrifuges in Iran.
• A significant reduction in the number of centrifuges
that are operational or can quickly become operational if Iran breaks the
agreement and decides to build a bomb.
• The closing of
the underground Fordo facility as an enrichment site, even if enrichment
activities are suspended there.
• Iranian
compliance in revealing its past activities with possible military dimensions
• A commitment to
ship its stockpile of enriched uranium out of Iran.
• And the
ability for inspectors charged with verifying the agreement to go “anywhere,
anytime” in Iran.
The reaction from Israel came after President Obama’s
assurances that
the preliminary agreement was the “best bet by far” to prevent Tehran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon and his pledge to the Israelis that the United
States had “got their backs.”
Mr. Steinitz said that the suggestion that there was no
alternative to the framework agreed in Lausanne, or that Israel had not put
forward an alternative, “is wrong.”
“The alternative
is not necessarily to declare war on Iran,” he said, briefing international
reporters at a Jerusalem hotel. “It is to increase pressure on Iran and stand
firm and make Iran make serious concessions and have a much better deal.”
The
disagreements between Israel and the Obama administration over the Iran talks
have severely strained the American-Israeli relationship in recent months, with
the tone on both sides often
confrontational.
The White House
was infuriated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to address a
joint session of Congress in March in order to criticize the
emerging agreement without
consulting the White House.
Despite Mr.
Obama’s more conciliatory tone toward Israel in recent days, Israel has made it
clear that it intends to keep up the pressure when it comes to Iran. On Sunday,
Mr. Netanyahu appeared on ABC’s “This Week,” CNN’s “State of the Union” and NBC
News’s “Meet the Press,” where he said, “I’m not trying to kill any deal. I’m
trying to kill a bad deal.”
There has been criticism in Israel of Mr. Netanyahu’s
approach. Efraim Halevy, a former chief of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency,
suggested that those in Israel who have been critical of Mr. Obama should
change their tone.
Mr. Halevy told Israel’s Army Radio on Monday that Israel
has three months to lobby the Obama administration to improve specific points
of the agreement with Iran. “In order to influence you have to act with a
certain kind of respect for your partner,” he said.
In Jerusalem on
Monday Mr. Steinitz, the minister of intelligence and strategic affairs, said
that Israel would be making further efforts to persuade the Obama administration
and Congress, as well as Britain, France, Russia and other world powers, “not
to sign this bad deal or at least to dramatically change or fix it.”
Referring to Mr. Obama’s explanation in
an interview with Thomas L. Friedman, a columnist for The New York
Times, that if Iran objected to site inspections an international mechanism
would be in place to assess those objections, Mr. Steinitz said that was “not
good enough.” It was unsatisfactory, Mr. Steinitz said, because of the time
required to refer suspicions to a committee and also because nobody would want
to expose sensitive intelligence data to a committee that included an Iranian presence.
Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear arsenal but
maintains a policy of ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying that it
possesses nuclear weapons.
Iran and the Obama Doctrine
In September 1996, I visited
Iran. One of my most enduring memories of that trip was that in my hotel lobby
there was a sign above the doorproclaiming “Down With USA.” But it wasn’t a
banner or graffiti. It was tiled and plastered into the wall. I thought to
myself: “Wow — that’s tiled in there! That won’t come out easily.” Nearly 20
years later, in the wake of a draft deal between the Obama administration and
Iran, we have what may be the best chance to begin to pry that sign loose, to
ease the U.S.-Iran cold/hot war that has roiled the region for 36 years. But it
is a chance fraught with real risks to America, Israel and our Sunni Arab
allies: that Iran could eventually become a nuclear-armed state.
Thomas L. Friedman
President Obama invited me to
the Oval Office Saturday afternoon to lay out exactly how he was trying to
balance these risks and opportunities in the framework accord reached with Iran
last week in Switzerland. What struck me most was what I’d call an “Obama
doctrine” embedded in the president’s remarks. It emerged when I asked if there
was a common denominator to his decisions to break free from longstanding
United States policies isolating Burma, Cuba and now Iran. Obama said his view
was that “engagement,” combined with meeting core strategic needs, could serve
American interests vis-à-vis these three countries far better than endless
sanctions and isolation. He added that America, with its overwhelming power,
needs to have the self-confidence to take some calculated risks to open important
new possibilities — like trying to forge a diplomatic deal with Iran that,
while permitting it to keep some of its nuclear infrastructure, forestalls its
ability to build a nuclear bomb for at least a decade, if not longer.
“We are powerful enough to be able to test
these propositions without putting ourselves at risk. And that’s the thing ...
people don’t seem to understand,” the president said. “You take a country like
Cuba. For us to test the possibility that engagement leads to a better outcome
for the Cuban people, there aren’t that many risks for us. It’s a tiny little
country. It’s not one that threatens our core security interests, and so
[there’s no reason not] to test the proposition. And if it turns out that it
doesn’t lead to better outcomes, we can adjust our policies. The same is true
with respect to Iran, a larger country, a dangerous country, one that has
engaged in activities that resulted in the death of U.S. citizens, but the
truth of the matter is: Iran’s defense budget is $30 billion. Our defense
budget is closer to $600 billion. Iran understands that they cannot fight us.
... You asked about an Obama doctrine. The doctrine is: We will engage, but we
preserve all our capabilities.
The notion that Iran is
undeterrable — “it’s simply not the case,” he added. “And so for us to say,
‘Let’s try’ — understanding that we’re preserving all our options, that we’re
not naïve — but if in fact we can resolve these issues diplomatically, we are
more likely to be safe, more likely to be secure, in a better position to
protect our allies, and who knows? Iran may change. If it doesn’t, our
deterrence capabilities, our military superiority stays in place. ... We’re not
relinquishing our capacity to defend ourselves or our allies. In that situation,
why wouldn’t we test it?”
Obviously, Israel is in a
different situation, he added. “Now, what you might hear from Prime Minister
[Benjamin] Netanyahu, which I respect, is the notion, ‘Look, Israel is more
vulnerable. We don’t have the luxury of testing these propositions the way you
do,’ and I completely understand that. And further, I completely understand
Israel’s belief that given the tragic history of the Jewish people, they can’t
be dependent solely on us for their own security. But what I would say to them
is that not only am I absolutely committed to making sure that they maintain
their qualitative military edge, and that they can deter any potential future
attacks, but what I’m willing to do is to make the kinds of commitments that
would give everybody in the neighborhood, including Iran, a clarity that if
Israel were to be attacked by any state, that we would stand by them. And that,
I think, should be ... sufficient to take advantage of this once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity to see whether or not we can at least take the nuclear issue off
the table.”
He added: “What I would say to
the Israeli people is ... that there is no formula, there is no option, to
prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that will be more effective than the
diplomatic initiative and framework that we put forward — and that’s
demonstrable.”
The president gave voice,
though — in a more emotional and personal way than I’ve ever heard — to his
distress at being depicted in Israel and among American Jews as somehow anti-Israel,
when his views on peace are shared by many center-left Israelis and his
administration has been acknowledged by Israeli officials to have been as
vigorous as any in maintaining Israel’s strategic edge.
With huge amounts of
conservative campaign money now flowing to candidates espousing pro-Israel
views, which party is more supportive of Israel is becoming a wedge issue, an
arms race, with Republican candidates competing over who can be the most
unreservedly supportive of Israel in any disagreement with the United States,
and ordinary, pro-Israel Democrats increasingly feeling sidelined.
This is an area that I’ve been
concerned about,” the president said. “Look, Israel is a robust, rowdy
democracy. ... We share so much. We share blood, family. ... And part of what
has always made the U.S.-Israeli relationship so special is that it has
transcended party, and I think that has to be preserved. There has to be the
ability for me to disagree with a policy on settlements, for example, without
being viewed as ... opposing Israel. There has to be a way for Prime Minister
Netanyahu to disagree with me on policy without being viewed as anti-Democrat,
and I think the right way to do it is to recognize that as many commonalities
as we have, there are going to be strategic differences. And I think that it is
important for each side to respect the debate that takes place in the other
country and not try to work just with one side. ... But this has been as hard
as anything I do because of the deep affinities that I feel for the Israeli
people and for the Jewish people. It’s been a hard period.”
You take it personally? I
asked.
“It has been personally
difficult for me to hear ... expressions that somehow ... this administration
has not done everything it could to look out for Israel’s interest — and the
suggestion that when we have very serious policy differences, that that’s not
in the context of a deep and abiding friendship and concern and understanding
of the threats that the Jewish people have faced historically and continue to
face.”
As for protecting our Sunni
Arab allies, like Saudi Arabia, the president said, they have some very real
external threats, but they also have some internal threats — “populations that,
in some cases, are alienated, youth that are underemployed, an ideology that is
destructive and nihilistic, and in some cases, just a belief that there are no
legitimate political outlets for grievances. And so part of our job is to work
with these states and say, ‘How can we build your defense capabilities against
external threats, but also, how can we strengthen the body politic in these
countries, so that Sunni youth feel that they’ve got something other than [the
Islamic State, or ISIS] to choose from. ... I think the biggest threats that
they face may not be coming from Iran invading. It’s going to be from
dissatisfaction inside their own countries. ... That’s a tough conversation to
have, but it’s one that we have to have.”
That said, the Iran deal is far
from finished. As the president cautioned: “We’re not done yet. There are a lot
of details to be worked out, and you could see backtracking and slippage and
real political difficulties, both in Iran and obviously here in the United
States Congress.”
On Congress’s role, Obama said
he insists on preserving the presidential prerogative to enter into binding
agreements with foreign powers without congressional approval. However, he
added, “I do think that [Tennessee Republican] Senator Corker, the head of the
Foreign Relations Committee, is somebody who is sincerely concerned about this
issue and is a good and decent man, and my hope is that we can find something
that allows Congress to express itself but does not encroach on traditional
presidential prerogatives — and ensures that, if in fact we get a good deal,
that we can go ahead and implement it.”
Since President Obama has had
more direct and indirect dealings with Iran’s leadership — including an
exchange of numerous letters with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
— than any of his predecessors since Iran’s revolution in 1979, I asked what he
has learned from the back and forth.
“I think that it’s important to
recognize that Iran is a complicated country — just like we’re a complicated country,”
the president said. “There is no doubt that, given the history between our two
countries, that there is deep mistrust that is not going to fade away
immediately. The activities that they engage in, the rhetoric, both
anti-American, anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, is deeply disturbing. There are deep
trends in the country that are contrary to not only our own national security
interests and views but those of our allies and friends in the region, and
those divisions are real.”
But, he added, “what we’ve also
seen is that there is a practical streak to the Iranian regime. I think they
are concerned about self-preservation. I think they are responsive, to some
degree, to their publics. I think the election of [President Hassan] Rouhani
indicated that there was an appetite among the Iranian people for a rejoining
with the international community, an emphasis on the economics and the desire
to link up with a global economy. And so what we’ve seen over the last several
years, I think, is the opportunity for those forces within Iran that want to
break out of the rigid framework that they have been in for a long time to move
in a different direction. It’s not a radical break, but it’s one that I think
offers us the chance for a different type of relationship, and this nuclear
deal, I think, is a potential expression of that.”
What about Iran’s supreme
leader, who will be the ultimate decider there on whether or not Iran moves
ahead? What have you learned about him?
“He’s a pretty tough read,” the
president said. “I haven’t spoken to him directly. In the letters that he
sends, there [are] typically a lot of reminders of what he perceives as past
grievances against Iran, but what is, I think, telling is that he did give his
negotiators in this deal the leeway, the capability to make important
concessions, that would allow this framework agreement to come to fruition. So
what that tells me is that — although he is deeply suspicious of the West [and]
very insular in how he thinks about international issues as well as domestic
issues, and deeply conservative — he does realize that the sanctions regime
that we put together was weakening Iran over the long term, and that if in fact
he wanted to see Iran re-enter the community of nations, then there were going
to have to be changes.”
Since he has acknowledged
Israel’s concerns, and the fact that they are widely shared there, if the
president had a chance to make his case for this framework deal directly to the
Israeli people, what would he say?
“Well, what I’d say to them is
this,” the president answered. “You have every right to be concerned about
Iran. This is a regime that at the highest levels has expressed the desire to
destroy Israel, that has denied the Holocaust, that has expressed venomous
anti-Semitic ideas and is a big country with a big population and has a
sophisticated military. So Israel is right to be concerned about Iran, and they
should be absolutely concerned that Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon.” But, he
insisted, this framework initiative, if it can be implemented, can satisfy that
Israeli strategic concern with more effectiveness and at less cost to Israel
than any other approach. “We know that a military strike or a series of
military strikes can set back Iran’s nuclear program for a period of time — but
almost certainly will prompt Iran to rush towards a bomb, will provide an
excuse for hard-liners inside of Iran to say, ‘This is what happens when you
don’t have a nuclear weapon: America attacks.’
“We know that if we do nothing, other than
just maintain sanctions, that they will continue with the building of their
nuclear infrastructure and we’ll have less insight into what exactly is
happening,” Obama added. “So this may not be optimal. In a perfect world, Iran
would say, ‘We won’t have any nuclear infrastructure at all,’ but what we know
is that this has become a matter of pride and nationalism for Iran. Even those
who we consider moderates and reformers are supportive of some nuclear program
inside of Iran, and given that they will not capitulate completely, given that
they can’t meet the threshold that Prime Minister Netanyahu sets forth, there
are no Iranian leaders who will do that. And given the fact that this is a
country that withstood an eight-year war and a million people dead, they’ve shown
themselves willing, I think, to endure hardship when they considered a point of
national pride or, in some cases, national survival.”
The president continued: “For
us to examine those options and say to ourselves, ‘You know what, if we can
have vigorous inspections, unprecedented, and we know at every point along
their nuclear chain exactly what they’re doing and that lasts for 20 years, and
for the first 10 years their program is not just frozen but effectively rolled
back to a larger degree, and we know that even if they wanted to cheat we would
have at least a year, which is about three times longer than we’d have right
now, and we would have insights into their programs that we’ve never had
before,’ in that circumstance, the notion that we wouldn’t take that deal right
now and that that would not be in Israel’s interest is simply incorrect.”
Because, Obama argued, “the one
thing that changes the equation is when these countries get a nuclear weapon.
... Witness North Korea, which is a problem state that is rendered a lot more
dangerous because of their nuclear program. If we can prevent that from
happening anyplace else in the world, that’s something where it’s worth taking
some risks.”
“I have to respect the fears
that the Israeli people have,” he added, “and I understand that Prime Minister
Netanyahu is expressing the deep-rooted concerns that a lot of the Israeli
population feel about this, but what I can say to them is: Number one, this is
our best bet by far to make sure Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon, and number
two, what we will be doing even as we enter into this deal is sending a very
clear message to the Iranians and to the entire region that if anybody messes
with Israel, America will be there. And I think the combination of a diplomatic
path that puts the nuclear issue to one side — while at the same time sending a
clear message to the Iranians that you have to change your behavior more
broadly and that we are going to protect our allies if you continue to engage
in destabilizing aggressive activity — I think that’s a combination that
potentially at least not only assures our friends, but starts bringing down the
temperature.”
There is clearly a debate going on inside
Iran as to whether the country should go ahead with this framework deal as
well, so what would the president say to the Iranian people to persuade them
that this deal is in their interest?
If their leaders really are
telling the truth that Iran is not seeking a nuclear weapon, the president
said, then “the notion that they would want to expend so much on a symbolic
program as opposed to harnessing the incredible talents and ingenuity and
entrepreneurship of the Iranian people, and be part of the world economy and
see their nation excel in those terms, that should be a pretty straightforward
choice for them. Iran doesn’t need nuclear weapons to be a powerhouse in the
region. For that matter, what I’d say to the Iranian people is: You don’t need
to be anti-Semitic or anti-Israel or anti-Sunni to be a powerhouse in the
region. I mean, the truth is, Iran has all these potential assets going for it
where, if it was a responsible international player, if it did not engage in
aggressive rhetoric against its neighbors, if it didn’t express anti-Israeli
and anti-Jewish sentiment, if it maintained a military that was sufficient to
protect itself, but was not engaging in a whole bunch of proxy wars around the
region, by virtue of its size, its resources and its people it would be an
extremely successful regional power. And so my hope is that the Iranian people
begin to recognize that.”
Clearly, he added, “part of the
psychology of Iran is rooted in past experiences, the sense that their country
was undermined, that the United States or the West meddled in first their
democracy and then in supporting the Shah and then in supporting Iraq and
Saddam during that extremely brutal war. So part of what I’ve told my team is
we have to distinguish between the ideologically driven, offensive Iran and the
defensive Iran that feels vulnerable and sometimes may be reacting because they
perceive that as the only way that they can avoid repeats of the past. ... But
if we’re able to get this done, then what may happen — and I’m not counting on
it — but what may happen is that those forces inside of Iran that say, ‘We
don’t need to view ourselves entirely through the lens of our war machine. Let’s
excel in science and technology and job creation and developing our people,’
that those folks get stronger. ... I say that emphasizing that the nuclear deal
that we’ve put together is not based on the idea that somehow the regime
changes.
“It is a good deal even if Iran
doesn’t change at all,” Obama argued. “Even for somebody who believes, as I
suspect Prime Minister Netanyahu believes, that there is no difference between
Rouhani and the supreme leader and they’re all adamantly anti-West and anti-Israel
and perennial liars and cheaters — even if you believed all that, this still
would be the right thing to do. It would still be the best option for us to
protect ourselves. In fact, you could argue that if they are implacably opposed
to us, all the more reason for us to want to have a deal in which we know what
they’re doing and that, for a long period of time, we can prevent them from
having a nuclear weapon.”
There are several very
sensitive points in the framework agreement that are not clear to me, and I
asked the president for his interpretation. For instance, if we suspect that
Iran is cheating, is harboring a covert nuclear program outside of the declared
nuclear facilities covered in this deal — say, at a military base in
southeastern Iran — do we have the right to insist on that facility being
examined by international inspectors?
“In the first instance, what we
have agreed to is that we will be able to inspect and verify what’s happening
along the entire nuclear chain from the uranium mines all the way through to
the final facilities like Natanz,” the president said. “What that means is that
we’re not just going to have a bunch of folks posted at two or three or five
sites. We are going to be able to see what they’re doing across the board, and in
fact, if they now wanted to initiate a covert program that was designed to
produce a nuclear weapon, they’d have to create a whole different supply chain.
That’s point number one. Point number two, we’re actually going to be setting
up a procurement committee that examines what they’re importing, what they’re
bringing in that they might claim as dual-use, to determine whether or not what
they’re using is something that would be appropriate for a peaceful nuclear
program versus a weapons program. And number three, what we’re going to be
doing is setting up a mechanism whereby, yes, I.A.E.A. [International Atomic
Energy Agency] inspectors can go anyplace.”
Anywhere in Iran? I asked.
“That we suspect,” the
president answered. “Obviously, a request will have to be made. Iran could
object, but what we have done is to try to design a mechanism whereby once
those objections are heard, that it is not a final veto that Iran has, but in
fact some sort of international mechanism will be in place that makes a fair
assessment as to whether there should be an inspection, and if they determine
it should be, that’s the tiebreaker, not Iran saying, ‘No, you can’t come
here.’ So over all, what we’re seeing is not just the additional protocols that
I.A.E.A. has imposed on countries that are suspected of in the past having had
problematic nuclear programs, we’re going even beyond that, and Iran will be
subject to the kinds of inspections and verification mechanisms that have never
been put in place before.”
A lot of people, myself
included, will want to see the fine print on that. Another issue that doesn’t
seem to have been resolved yet is: When exactly do the economic sanctions on
Iran get lifted? When the implementation begins? When Iran has been deemed to
be complying fully?
“There are still details to be
worked out,” the president said, “but I think that the basic framework calls
for Iran to take the steps that it needs to around [the Fordow enrichment
facility], the centrifuges, and so forth. At that point, then, the U.N.
sanctions are suspended; although the sanctions related to proliferation, the
sanctions related to ballistic missiles, there’s a set of sanctions that remain
in place. At that point, then, we preserve the ability to snap back those
sanctions, if there is a violation. If not, though, Iran, outside of the
proliferation and ballistic missile issues that stay in place, they’re able to
get out from under the sanctions, understanding that this constant monitoring
will potentially trigger some sort of action if they’re in violation.”
There are still United States
sanctions that are related to Iran’s behavior in terrorism and human rights
abuse, though, the president added: “There are certain sanctions that we have
that would remain in place because they’re not related to Iran’s nuclear
program, and this, I think, gets to a central point that we’ve made
consistently. If in fact we are able to finalize the nuclear deal, and if Iran
abides by it, that’s a big piece of business that we’ve gotten done, but it does
not end our problems with Iran, and we are still going to be aggressively
working with our allies and friends to reduce — and hopefully at some point
stop — the destabilizing activities that Iran has engaged in, the sponsorship
of terrorist organizations. And that may take some time. But it’s our belief,
it’s my belief, that we will be in a stronger position to do so if the nuclear
issue has been put in a box. And if we can do that, it’s possible that Iran,
seeing the benefits of sanctions relief, starts focusing more on the economy
and its people. And investment starts coming in, and the country starts opening
up. If we’ve done a good job in bolstering the sense of security and defense
cooperation between us and the Sunni states, if we have made even more certain
that the Israeli people are absolutely protected not just by their own
capacities, but also by our commitments, then what’s possible is you start
seeing an equilibrium in the region, and Sunni and Shia, Saudi and Iran start
saying, ‘Maybe we should lower tensions and focus on the extremists like [ISIS]
that would burn down this entire region if they could.’ ”
Regarding America’s Sunni Arab
allies, Obama reiterated that while he is prepared to help increase their
military capabilities they also need to increase their willingness to commit
their ground troops to solving regional problems.
“The conversations I want to
have with the Gulf countries is, first and foremost, how do they build more
effective defense capabilities,” the president said. “I think when you look at
what happens in Syria, for example, there’s been a great desire for the United
States to get in there and do something. But the question is: Why is it that we
can’t have Arabs fighting [against] the terrible human rights abuses that have
been perpetrated, or fighting against what Assad has done? I also think that I
can send a message to them about the U.S.’s commitments to work with them and
ensure that they are not invaded from the outside, and that perhaps will ease
some of their concerns and allow them to have a more fruitful conversation with
the Iranians. What I can’t do, though, is commit to dealing with some of these
internal issues that they have without them making some changes that are more
responsive to their people.”
One way to think about it,
Obama continued, “is [that] when it comes to external aggression, I think we’re
going to be there for our [Arab] friends — and I want to see how we can
formalize that a little bit more than we currently have, and also help build
their capacity so that they feel more confident about their ability to protect
themselves from external aggression.” But, he repeated, “The biggest threats
that they face may not be coming from Iran invading. It’s going to be from
dissatisfaction inside their own countries. Now disentangling that from real
terrorist activity inside their country, how we sort that out, how we engage in
the counterterrorism cooperation that’s been so important to our own security —
without automatically legitimizing or validating whatever repressive tactics
they may employ — I think that’s a tough conversation to have, but it’s one
that we have to have.”
It feels lately like some
traditional boundaries between the executive and legislative branches, when it
comes to the conduct of American foreign policy, have been breached. For
instance, there was the letter from 47 Republican senators to Iran’s supreme
leader cautioning him on striking any deal with Obama not endorsed by them —
coming in the wake of Prime Minister Netanyahu being invited by the speaker of
the House, John Boehner, to address a joint session of Congress — without
consulting the White House. How is Obama taking this?
“I do worry that some
traditional boundaries in how we think about foreign policy have been crossed,”
the president said. “I felt the letter that was sent to the supreme leader was
inappropriate. I think that you will recall there were some deep disagreements
with President Bush about the Iraq war, but the notion that you would have had
a whole bunch of Democrats sending letters to leaders in the region or to
European leaders ... trying to undermine the president’s policies I think is
troubling.
“The bottom line,” he added, “is that we’re
going to have serious debates, serious disagreements, and I welcome those
because that’s how our democracy is supposed to work, and in today’s
international environment, whatever arguments we have here, other people are
hearing and reading about it. It’s not a secret that the Republicans may feel
more affinity with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s views of the Iran issue than they
do with mine. But [we need to be] keeping that within some formal boundaries,
so that the executive branch, when it goes overseas, when it’s communicating
with foreign leaders, is understood to be speaking on behalf of the United
States of America, not a divided United States of America, making sure that
whether that president is a Democrat or a Republican that once the debates have
been had here, that he or she is the spokesperson on behalf of U.S. foreign
policy. And that’s clear to every leader around the world. That’s important
because without that, what you start getting is multiple foreign policies,
confusion among foreign powers as to who speaks for who, and that ends up being
a very dangerous — circumstances that could be exploited by our enemies and
could deeply disturb our friends.”
As for the Obama doctrine — “we
will engage, but we preserve all our capabilities” — the president concluded:
“I’ve been very clear that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch, and
I think they should understand that we mean it. But I say that hoping that we
can conclude this diplomatic arrangement — and that it ushers a new era in
U.S.-Iranian relations — and, just as importantly, over time, a new era in
Iranian relations with its neighbors.”
Whatever happened in the past,
he said, “at this point, the U.S.’s core interests in the region are not oil,
are not territorial. ... Our core interests are that everybody is living in
peace, that it is orderly, that our allies are not being attacked, that
children are not having barrel bombs dropped on them, that massive
displacements aren’t taking place. Our interests in this sense are really just
making sure that the region is working. And if it’s working well, then we’ll do
fine. And that’s going to be a big project, given what’s taken place, but I think
this [Iran framework deal] is at least one place to start.”
********
No
wonder Obama’s credibility today in Israel matches that of Baghdad Bob in 2003