An ideal agreement would force Iran to stop all uranium enrichment. Most of the other alternatives are bad.
Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov
Wall
Street Journal, Oct. 15, 2013 7:17 p.m. ET
Hopes are running high in many quarters that the West and Iran
could begin to work out a deal over the Iranian nuclear program this week in
Geneva. As the Iranian deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, put it before
the negotiations began on Tuesday: "We need to move towards a
trust-building road map with the Westerners." Such sweet talk—and the
White House's strong desire to avoid a confrontation with Tehran—could result
in a dangerous deal that would lift international sanctions on Iran without
ensuring an end to the Islamic Republic's nuclear-weapons program.
This is not to say that any diplomatic solution would be a bad
deal for the West. A diplomatic solution is welcome if it actually offers a
better alternative than the two current options: bombing Iran's nuclear program
or accepting Iran with a nuclear weapon.
We see four types of potential deals that the six major powers
currently gathered in Geneva could make with Iran: an ideal agreement, a
reasonable agreement, a bad agreement and an agreement in phases.
The ideal agreement for the so-called P5+1 (the permanent United
Nations Security Council members—the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K. and
France—plus Germany) consists of an Iranian commitment to dismantle its nuclear
program. Tehran would stop enrichment at all levels—even for nonmilitary
purposes. It would close Fordow, its underground enrichment facility, and the
Arak reactor, which is capable of producing plutonium for a bomb. Iran would
also have to ship out its entire stockpile of enriched uranium, which today is
enough to produce five to seven bombs.
Such an agreement would meet the stipulated demands of the
Security Council, as well as prior demands by the U.S. and Israel. In exchange,
the West would lift all sanctions on Iran.
A less good, but still reasonable, agreement would be a
compromise that meticulously addresses the critical elements of Iran's nuclear
program. Iran would retain its right to enrich uranium, but only to a low
3.5%-5% nonmilitary grade.
This agreement would put clear limits on Iran's centrifuges. The
country, which currently has more than 19,000, would be allowed to keep a
small, symbolic number to prove that Iran has the presumptive right to enrich
for nonmilitary purposes. It would also cap the amount of enriched material,
which the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee. To ensure this,
Iran would have to re-sign and implement the additional protocol, which would
enable the IAEA to carry out much more thorough inspections. The Iranians would
also have to guarantee that the Arak reactor is not functional. Fordow would be
closed, and all Iranian nuclear activity would have to be carried out at
Natanz. Last, the transformation to fuel rods would be done outside of Iran to
ensure that the Iranians won't ever be able to use the enriched uranium for a
bomb in case they abandon the agreement in the future.
Although such an agreement does not meet the Security Council's
demand for Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, it would give the West enough
time to detect any Iranian violation—and, critically, to stop Iran from
producing nuclear weapons if necessary. This compromise would prolong the
Iranian breakout capacity timeline to years rather than months, and it may well
be preferable to bombing Iran's nuclear program or accepting an Iranian nuclear
weapon.
A bad agreement would have the West ease sanctions against
Tehran in exchange for a partial dismantlement of its nuclear program. Such a
deal could, for example, limit Iran's uranium-enrichment level to a nonmilitary
grade, but wouldn't put a cap on Iran's stockpile of centrifuges or wouldn't
force the regime to shut down the Arak reactor. This would be disastrous for
Western interests, because it would allow Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon
rapidly and whenever it wants, under the cover of an agreement with the
international community.
A fourth type of agreement would be a process of reciprocal,
partial steps designed to build trust between the two sides. For example, Iran
would agree not to continue to enrich to 20%, or would agree not to install new
centrifuges, in exchange for sanction relief. This seems to be the type of
agreement that the P5+1 is pursuing.
If the West is considering striking such a deal, maintaining
current economic sanctions on Iran is critical. Sanctions are the very leverage
that could be used to elicit a reasonable or even good deal at the end of the
process. Only after Iran proves its resolve to abandon all the key elements in
its military nuclear program should sanctions be lifted, and not a moment
before.
Of the four possible agreements between the West and Iran,
neither the bad deal nor the deal in phases can ensure the end of Iran's
nuclear program. They also don't offer an alternative preferable to currently
available options. On the contrary, they give cover to Iran's nuclear program
and place the decision-making power on the timing of nuclear-weapon breakout in
the mullahs' hands.
By the end of Tuesday's negotiations, Iranian foreign minister
Javad Zarif had offered a PowerPoint presentation, details publicly unknown but
described as "very useful" by the spokesman for the European Union's
top foreign-policy official at the talks. According to several reports, the
basic outline of the Iranian proposal has Tehran offering to limit enrichment
in exchange for the West easing up on sanctions. So far, it sounds like the
worst kind of reciprocal agreement—one in which the West would be forced to
give up on its key leverage.
In a recent interview President Obama said that he would not
take "a bad deal." What he means by that isn't clear. The U.S.,
Europe and Israel must privately come to an agreement on what a bad deal would
look like—and, just as important, get on the same page about the parameters of
a good deal, which would ensure that Iran is years away from the bomb.
Western diplomats in Geneva need to find their way to a
reasonable deal if reaching an ideal agreement proves impossible. A bad deal or
even a phased agreement would be a defeat. In dealing with Iran, this is the
hour of truth for Western diplomacy.
Gen. Yadlin, who is retired from the military, is a former chief
of Israeli defense intelligence and the director of Israel's Institute for
National Security Studies, where Mr. Golov is a researcher.
