The five permanent members of the Security
Council and Germany nullify the United Nations sanctions regarding Iran.
HAMBURG, November 24, 2013—During the night of
November 24, 2013, it came to this: The five permanent members of the Security
Council and Germany signed an interim agreement that accepts the plutonium
facility at Arak and approves Iran’s continued uranium enrichment. “This deal
appears to provide the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism with billions of
dollars in exchange for cosmetic concessions,” criticized Senator Mark Kirk
(R-Illinois).
The first victim of this surrender is the United
Nations.
On December 23, 2006, the UN Security Council
called, in a rare act of unanimity, on the regime in Tehran to suspend all
plutonium and uranium activities or otherwise to face sanctions. Since then
this position has been amplified in several UN decisions.
Until today, it was only the Tehran regime that
ignored this proclamation and failed to respect the UN positions. Today however
the above named 5+1 powers joined in this disregard for the UN positions. The
regime in Tehran has been rewarded for its provocative anti-UN policies and the
authority of the UN Security Council has been diminished.
The Plutonium Reactor will be Completed
First of all, there is the matter of the heavy
water reactor at Arak, which Iran does not need, except for the preparation of
weapons grade plutonium. The regime is counting on having this plutonium
reactor running by the end of 2014. It therefore refused to accept any
interruption in the construction work.
This refusal led to the collapse of the previous
round of negotiations in Geneva, after the French Foreign Minister Fabius
explained that he would not support a “deal for dummies.”
This deal, which was favored by the United
States and the other powers, including Germany, stipulated that Tehran would
promise not to activate the reactor during the next six months. “As a quid pro
quo,” continued construction of the reactor would be permitted.
But Tehran had repeatedly declared that it was
not planning on activating Arak before the end of 2014. The “quid pro quo” that
it would not do so during the next six months was, in fact, no concession at
all. Most of the 5+1 group really wanted to treat world opinion as a bunch of
“dummies.”
Now the new agreement includes the following
variation of the “Arak compromise”: With some minor restrictions, the reactor
can continue to be prepared for activation. What’s more is that the signatories
of the Geneva document declare that they are prepared to eventually accept the
activation of the plutonium reactor. Yet even the mere construction of the site
that lacks any civilian utility represents a breach of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
The “quid pro quo”: Iran promises to refrain
from installing any fuel rods or heavy water or “remaining components” during
the next six months and to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) with current design information about the reactor—a step to which Iran
would be obligated in any case according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet
there is no plan to provide IAEA inspectors access to the site.
Uranium Enrichment Continues
No “freezing” of uranium enrichment is intended.
According to the New York Times, the agreement “would not require
Iran to stop enriching uranium to a low level of 3–5 percent or dismantle any
of its existing centrifuges. Iran’s stockpile of such low-enriched uranium
would be allowed to temporarily increase to about eight tons from seven tons
currently. But Tehran would be required to shrink this stockpile by the end of
the six-month agreement back to seven tons. This would be done by installing
equipment to covert some of that stockpile to oxide.” (Michael R. Gordon, “Deal Reached
With Iran Halts Its Nuclear Program,” Nov. 23, 2013).
Thus, the agreement gives even approval to
an—allegedly temporary—significant expansion of the amounts of enriched uranium
is given.
In this context it is noteworthy that during the
next six months Iran is allowed to “continue its current enrichment Research
& Development practices” and to produce new centrifuges “to replace damaged
machines.” No centrifuge, however, will be dismantled.
When Syria’s poison gas supplies were to be
destroyed a few weeks ago, it was self-evident that the sites where the gas was
being produced would be destroyed first. Only afterward did one begin to
address the poison gas stockpiles themselves. This sequencing made sense in
order to prevent the Syrian dictator from quickly replenishing the poison gas
that was being taken away.
Iran is being handled differently: all the
facilities to enrich uranium remain in tact and not a single centrifuge will be
destroyed.
The surrender in
Geneva allows Iran to become a nuclear threshold state and provides legitimacy
and impetus for Iran’s efforts. It has made hopes for a peaceful resolution of
the nuclear conflict extremely difficult. The consequences are unpredictable.
Given these conditions, Iran could easily agree
to refrain from producing uranium enriched to 20% during the next six months.
Yet the existing supplies of 20% uranium will
not be moved to another country, as the 5+1 group has been demanding for years.
The supplies remain under Iranian control and should only be “diluted” or
transformed into uranoxide—the form in which uranium is used in fuel rods.
These are processes that can easily be reversed, if needed.
“To guard against cheating,” so reports
the New York Times, “international monitors would be allowed to
visit the Natanz enrichment facility and the underground nuclear enrichment
plant at Fordo on a daily basis to check the film from cameras installed
there.”
This proviso may look good at first, but it
leaves out the decisive detail: one can allow the inspectors temporary access,
but also remove them when necessary. This is precisely the tactic North Korea
used successfully to get its bomb.
In addition, the Geneva deal shows that the 5+1
were unsuccessful with other, key inspection issues. For more than ten years,
Iran has been blocking the use of the “additional protocol” of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would provide the Vienna Inspectors from the
IAEA expanded access, including to suspected secret installations. Moreover the
regime has been blocking efforts by the IAEA to analyze Iran’s previous nuclear
weapons research. These hide-and-seek policies will remain in place.
The Sanctions Will Run Out
Even though Iran can proceed both with uranium
enrichment and the preparation for plutonium production with minor and
reversible limitations, the 5+1 group essentially wants to suspend the
sanctions. According to the Wall Street Journal, the United States
assumes a sanctions reduction of six to seven billion dollars during the next
six months. Approval by the Congress, which is largely critical of Obama’s Iran
policy, is not necessary.
The United States intends to transfer to Iran
4.2 Billion dollars for oil revenue, which have so far been blocked by
sanctions; this will come to some 600 million dollars per month. The agreement
also demands to “suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports,
as well as sanctions on associated services” and on Gold, precious metals,
automobiles, and airplane spare parts.
The Obama administration is trying to pacify its
critics with the claim that the agreement is “limited, temporary, targeted, and
reversible.” It is to be used so that the next six months can allow for the
development of an agreement that will fully eliminate the Iranian nuclear
threat. But this is hardly likely!
Was the boast not proudly repeated that only
international pressure brought Tehran to the negotiating table? It is then
unclear why precisely the retreat from this pressure will lead the regime to
“genuine” concessions in the next six months.
When France called the earlier plan a “deal for
dummies,” it was being generous, wrote Charles
Krauthammer in the Washington Post. Krauthammer
continues:
“Don’t worry, we are assured. The sanctions
relief is reversible. Nonsense. It was extraordinarily difficult to cobble
together the current sanctions. Once the relaxation begins, how do you reverse
it? Adding back old sanctions will be denounced as a provocation that would
drive Iran to a nuclear breakout—exactly as Obama is today denouncing
congressional moves to increase sanctions as a deal-breaking provocation that
might lead Iran to break off talks.”
That’s the way it is. The surrender in Geneva
allows Iran to become a nuclear threshold state and provides legitimacy and
impetus for Iran’s efforts. It has made hopes for a peaceful resolution of the
nuclear conflict extremely difficult. The consequences are unpredictable.
Translated by Russell Berman
