This article
in the New York Daily News is not directly related to MAD, but it is so good that I had to
include it in this blog.
BY JOHN
BOLTON
Egypt’s security
forces have now moved decisively to eliminate Muslim Brotherhood protest camps
in Cairo, producing the bloodshed foretold by daily confrontations between the
Brotherhood’s supporters and opponents. Six weeks after the ouster of President
Mohammed Morsi, Egypt remains deeply and violently divided — and American
policy is confused and irresolute.
While confusion and
irresolution are nothing new to the Obama administration, this is not the place
to dither or make strategic mistakes. We must define precisely what U.S.
priorities are in light of Egypt’s strategic significance, and given the
potential for protracted hostilities there between armed combatants.
By identifying our
interests, we can concentrate our energies and resources on advancing them in
practical ways, avoiding an essentially academic debate over issues we can’t
significantly influence. Because our resources are not unlimited, we have to
focus our political time and attention, as well as our more tangible assets and
capabilities, where they can do the most good.
First, Egypt’s
continued adherence to the 1979 Camp David peace agreements with Israel is
essential. Anwar Sadat’s courageous decision to negotiate directly with Israel
was critical not only to establishing this foundation of America’s overall
Middle East policy, but also evidenced Egypt’s momentous shift, after the death
of longtime dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser, away from the Soviet Union. Sadat’s
sea change in allegiance provided an opening the U.S. used to undermine
Moscow’s extensive regional influence, and was an early sign that the Cold War
was entirely winnable.
In 1981, the Muslim
Brotherhood assassinated Sadat for his troubles, reflecting that then, as now,
the Brotherhood has only contempt for Egyptian leaders who seek peace with
Israel. If Morsi had enjoyed only a slightly longer tenure in office, he would
likely have abrogated Camp David entirely. The treaty’s demise would have
even further reduced U.S. influence throughout the Middle East, renewed
opportunities for anti-American, anti-Israeli radicals and increased threats to
friendly Arab regimes prepared to live with Egyptian (and Jordanian) peace
treaties with Israel. Make no mistake, if Washington takes Camp David for
granted, it will disappear, and quickly.
Second, the
economically vital Suez Canal runs through Egypt. If passage is blocked, as it
was in the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, or for years after the 1967 Six-Day War,
Europe and America will suffer, and so will Egypt. Already, 21/2 years of
domestic instability have made the Sinai Peninsula a haven for terrorists and
devastated Egypt’s economy, with both foreign investment and tourism revenues
plummeting.
Until political
stability is restored, the nation’s Gross Domestic Product will continue
eroding, impoverishing the entire society and further straining already
weakened social cohesion.
What Washington needs
to do is clear. U.S. policy should be to support only Egyptian leaders
unambiguously committed to Camp David, both to its terms and to its broader
regional significance. And we must assist those who place highest priority on
repairing Egypt’s badly weakened economy and securing its international economic
obligations, particularly safe transit through the Suez Canal.
Both Egypt’s military
and its “pro-democracy” elements support Camp David, while the Brotherhood does
not. There is, accordingly, no reason to advocate including the Brotherhood
into a “coalition” form of government or, frankly, to welcome them into the
political process at all.
After World War II, we
struggled without qualms to keep Communist parties from prevailing in Western
European elections; there is every reason to take the same role here.
In particular, that
means keeping aid flowing to Egypt’s military, which since 1979 has brought its
leadership close to Washington. We should fix whatever U.S. statutory problem
exists, and encourage Europe and friendly Arab states to follow our lead. We
should also leave our Egyptian friends flexibility in their internal political
debates.
This does not mean
granting them a completely blank check. It does mean rejecting the Obama
approach of essentially supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which is as much an
armed militia as a political party, and condemning the interim government.
We all have admirable
philosophical ideals about perfect democracy, but these must now be for
university debates, not judging the punctilio of daily Egyptian politics.
What is happening in
Egypt now is not pretty. We should take care that our efforts to improve things
don’t make them worse, disrupting our larger regional and worldwide interests.
