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Tuesday, August 30, 2022

Yuri Fedorov on the Ukrainian counter-offensive

 


Yuri Fedorov on The Breakfast Show said that he thinks that the Ukrainians with their attack yesterday were testing the Ukrainian defenses and the main idea was to split the Russian troops on the right bank of the Dnieper along the Inhulets river since the bridge at Darivka has also been destroyed. The Ukrainians have imposed a media silence, in order not to reveal their plans, and that more information will be revealed within 24-36 hours. Yuri Fedorov believes that there is also a  possibility that this attack might  be a diversion and that the main Ukrainian attack would come near Kharkov.

Meanwhile, in the land of Ukraine's Friend #1 …



 

Sunday, August 28, 2022

Andrei Piontkovsky: The MAD doctrine still works with Putin. Putin wants to live.

 


This quick translation from Russian is mine. (2:33 to 8:05)   

“Putin has been preparing for this war for a long time. About the doctrine developed by Putin and Patrushev, I wrote already since 2009. It is based the idea that while being inferior to the West economically, in civilizational terms, in the level of conventional military forces, they could still manage to win over the West through blackmail, impudent blackmail by threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons.

Their scenario with Ukraine and the West as a whole and NATO had been repeatedly stated at different levels, but most vividly it had been expressed by Putin himself when he was at the peak of euphoric victorious state on February 5 at the press conference after having met Macron. He said, yes, in conventional arms we are inferior to NATO, but on the nuclear level we are superior, and we can win.

Putin has no Wunderwaffen. Perhaps he believed in this, deceived by scoundrels who spent billions of dollars in the development of new redundant and unnecessary strategic nuclear arms with which he threatened the world. The world has been living under the MAD doctrine for a while and therefore nobody had been planning for a nuclear war because it would bring nuclear destruction unacceptable to all participants.   

Putin and Patrushev decided to threaten with tactical nuclear weapons. During the confrontation with NATO when NATO superiority manifests itself (which apparently as it turned out, they understood), they threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons and were convinced that the West would get scared, capitulate and back off.

This was his plan when he faced the collapse of his Blitzkrieg during the first days of the war in Ukraine. You can well remember that they sable rattled almost daily with nuclear weapons threatening to hit the convoys destined for Ukraine through NATO countries, Poland, Romania etc.

He was met with a very harsh resistance. The first to react to Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons and of Putin’s fate in case of use, was Ukraine’s Friend #1, the leader of the Free World in support of Ukraine, Boris Johnson. When Putin threatened the possible use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Johnson without waiting for the US reaction, and NATO’s as a whole, reminded him that the UK was a nuclear power in its own right and would not leave without punishment Putin’s use of nuclear weapons. Later similar warnings were given at the military level, by Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Mark Milley to Gerasimov, that Patrushev and Putin’s calculation that the West would capitulate was flawed and a response would be given, a devastating response to Russia and a response which would involve Putin himself. Translated into the language he would understand, i.e. into St. Petersburg street gang language, he was told that in case of use of nuclear weapons he would be killed. 

And you know, he understands this language. The last two-three weeks there have been in succession official statements by Russian responsible figures, both Putin and Shoigu, to that effect.  Putin in his letter to the UN conference on nuclear disarmament stated that they understood that nuclear war was impossible since there would be no winner. That is, he repeated the basic truths that have been for decades shared by all responsible world leaders since the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Shoigu recently stated that our nuclear weapons exist only to prevent a possible nuclear attack by other nuclear countries. That is, the threat to Putin’s life works, he is not a shahid who is willing to die for his great idea, when he said: ‘we as martyrs, will go to heaven. To no paradise does he intend to go.“

***

My comment:

I do hope Piontkovsky is right. We already have Iran. 


Friday, August 19, 2022

The Ukrainian response to the Washington Post "Road to war" article

 

From the WP article  Road to war: U.S. struggled to convince allies, and Zelensky, of risk of invasion :

But Zelensky resisted calls to relocate his government and was adamant that he not panic the public. Down that path, he thought, lay defeat.

“You can’t simply say to me, ‘Listen, you should start to prepare people now and tell them they need to put away money, they need to store up food,’ ” Zelensky recalled. “If we had communicated that — and that is what some people wanted, who I will not name — then I would have been losing $7 billion a month since last October, and at the moment when the Russians did attack, they would have taken us in three days. ... Generally, our inner sense was right: If we sow chaos among people before the invasion, the Russians will devour us. Because during chaos, people flee the country.”

For Zelensky, the decision to keep people in the country, where they could fight to defend their homes, was the key to repelling any invasion.

Alexei Arestovich, an advisor to Zelensky, gives a detailed explanation why Zelensky did not call the reserves in December. ( 13 min into the video)     


Monday, August 8, 2022

Putin’s desperation

Jerusalem Post, Letters to the Editor August 8, 2022


Yonah Jeremy Bob writes in “How significant is the latest Russia-Iran satellite launch?” (August 4): “the Russian leader rarely admits actions his country takes.” Now that is an understatement! Russia for weeks denied that it was about to invade Ukraine and when it did, it denied that it ever invaded.

Russian propaganda has reached unprecedented levels, as Predrag Petrović, the researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy observes following the events in Kosovo: “Somewhere around half past seven on July 31, when sirens were activated in Kosovska Mitrovica and other places in the North where Serbs live, and then barricades were erected, the information was still fresh and scarce, and militant Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels actively entered the game, and for hours they are filled with a mixture of information, semi-information and complete disinformation and distortions.”

So, on the one hand, we have a desperate Putin who is losing the war in Ukraine, transferring troops from the Donbas to the Kherson area to prevent a Ukrainian counterattack; and on the other, we have an undeterrable Iran approaching the bomb and Russia launching an Iranian satellite.

Surely the answer to Bob’s question is a no-brainer? If this time, in contrast to 1938, the West is trying to prevent Putin from occupying Europe, they better stop Iran from destroying not only Europe but everyone. Have they learned anything from February 24?

MLADEN ANDRIJASEVIC

Beersheba


Saturday, July 30, 2022

Alexei Arestovich's 2019 prediction of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war (with English subtitles)

 

Arestovich’s analysis was eerily accurate. I’ve been following his daily conversations with lawyer Mark Feygin since the war started, but this is the first time I ran across what he had said three years ago.

Arestovich is currently an Adviser to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine


Friday, July 29, 2022

Yuri Fedorov - Before the battle for Kherson

 Radio Svoboda 

Yuri Fedorov

The following is a modified Google translate from Russian

In early July, when Russian troops reached the borders of the Lugansk region, another phase of the war in Ukraine ended. Two or three weeks later, the contours of a new strategic situation and, consequently, the next stage of hostilities were outlined. More than half of the Russian forces deployed to Ukraine are located in the Donetsk region. Their primary task is to capture Bakhmut and the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, and then occupy the entire region. As a result, they expect in Moscow, the most important strategic goal of Vladimir Putin will be fulfilled - to include the entire territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the so-called people's republics. The rest of the Russian troops are engaged in positional battles in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, holding back the onslaught of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, the annexation of the territories occupied by Russia is being prepared. By declaring them part of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin, in the event of de-occupation attempts, can threaten to use all the means available to the country, including nuclear weapons.

In Ukraine, a decision was made to advance in the south. Task number one is to defeat the Russian group on the right bank of the Dnieper and liberate Kherson. With a favorable development of events, the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be continued to liberate the entire Kherson region, the occupied part of the Zaporozhye region and access to the Perekop isthmus and the approaches to Chongar. But even if only Kherson can be liberated by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this will be the largest military and political victory for Ukraine and a heavy defeat for Russia. In particular, plans to annex the Kherson region will be frustrated: it is impossible to hold a "referendum" at the gunpoint of Ukrainian HIMARS.

How successful can the Ukrainian offensive in the south be and how will the situation develop in the autumn-winter campaign of 2022? In recent weeks, many articles have appeared in the West arguing that Ukraine cannot win the war with Russia, and therefore must agree to a settlement of the conflict on Russian terms; in other words, capitulate. Leaving aside the question of the motivation of the authors of such statements, some of which may be quite sincerely mistaken, I will turn to the facts.

In the first 7–10 days of the war, as a result of the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the political leadership of the country for war, Russian troops approached Kyiv, Chernigov, Sumy and Kharkov, seized vast territories in the south. However, by the end of March they were forced out of the northeastern regions. Moscow announced the battle for the Donbass, which will decide the fate of the war. Russia's achievements in this "battle" are not impressive: it took more than three months to reach the borders of the Lugansk region. Despite the superiority of the Russian troops in armaments, sometimes multiple, the pace of the offensive turned out to be extremely low, and the losses were very high. British Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Anthony Radakin said that during the four and a half months of the war, Russia lost about 1,700 tanks and 4,400 armored fighting vehicles. This exceeds the data on the losses of these weapons provided at that time by the Ukrainian military command.

At the same time, systemic flaws in the Russian military system were revealed, which cannot be eliminated in combat conditions. First of all, the Russian armed forces were lined up like a blitzkrieg army. It was assumed that the airborne divisions and strike formations would capture the key political and military centers of Ukraine or the Baltic states (these countries were on the Kremlin’s list of priority targets), reach the Polish border or even break through to the Vistula in a few days. Moscow then intended to present NATO with "The Devil’s Alternative": capitulation or nuclear war. Such ideas predetermined the special role of the Airborne Forces, consisting of four divisions and four brigades, in planning future operations and in the structure of the armed forces. An attempt to capture the airfield in Gostomel in order to land a landing force capable of capturing Kyiv failed. After that, the Airborne Forces were used (and are being used) in Ukraine in the most dangerous areas as an elite motorized infantry and, accordingly, suffer heavy losses. The share of the ground forces, which bear the brunt of hostilities, has been underestimated in Russia to 28 percent of the total armed forces (in the Chinese army, for example, the ground forces account for 50 percent of the personnel). These forces are not enough to achieve a convincing victory in any lengthy war with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Perhaps, understanding this circumstance, the Russian command planned, repeating the experience of the Second World War, powerful tank strikes, breakthroughs in the enemy’s defenses, encirclement and destruction of his groupings. These plans remained on paper. The saturation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with modern light anti-tank weapons devalued the actions of tank units. Javelin missiles (6,500 of them were delivered to Ukraine) destroyed the tanks before they had time to reach the distance of aimed fire. The presence of a large number of man-portable air defense missile systems among the Ukrainian troops made it possible, to some extent, to neutralize the superiority of Russia in front-line aviation. As a result, Russian forces have had to rely on missile strikes, mainly on civilian targets, and "barrage" tactics - massive artillery raids that wipe out one city block after another from the face of the earth. High-precision American multiple launch rocket systems, creating serious logistical difficulties for the Russian army, reduce the effectiveness of artillery. As a result, in the autumn-winter campaign, Russia's superiority in arms will, if not reduced to zero, then significantly weakened.

The first major battles of the new phase of hostilities may begin as early as August, when Ukrainian troops are expected to move to the offensive on Kherson. It has a good chance of success for two reasons. Firstly, the supply lines of the Russian group on the right bank pass through two bridges across the Dnieper: along the Antonovsky bridge near Kherson and on the other, located next to the dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station. Both bridges are extremely vulnerable and will most likely be destroyed by HIMARS strikes before the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Secondly, a significant part of the Russian troops is involved in protracted battles in the Donetsk region. If some of them are transferred to the south to repel the Ukrainian offensive, then the task of occupying the entire Donetsk region will certainly not be completed. Consequently, the main political goal of the "battle for Donbass" will not be achieved.

The loss of the right-bank part of the Kherson region may mean the beginning of the failure of the entire "special military operation." How Moscow will solve the problem of retaining these lands is not yet clear. One can, however, assume that such a task has no real solution at all, unless the Kremlin decides to mobilize the conscripts. But even in this case, it will take a considerable time, at least one and a half to two months, and by this time the fate of Kherson will be decided.

The contours of the first stage of the autumn-winter campaign are seen more or less clearly: the "battle for Kherson." You can design various scenarios for the further development of events. But all of them, in fact, come down to two main options: either Moscow is forced to negotiate on Ukrainian terms (that is, at least leaves the Ukrainian territories occupied after February 23), or the war of attrition continues, in which Ukraine will receive a growing economic and military assistance from Western countries. Given the balance of power between Russia and the "collective West", Moscow will not be able to avoid defeat in this war.

Yuri Fedorov is a military-political expert based in Prague