In early July, when Russian troops reached
the borders of the Lugansk region, another phase of the war in Ukraine ended.
Two or three weeks later, the contours of a new strategic situation and,
consequently, the next stage of hostilities were outlined. More than half of
the Russian forces deployed to Ukraine are located in the Donetsk region. Their
primary task is to capture Bakhmut and the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration,
and then occupy the entire region. As a result,
they expect in Moscow, the most important strategic goal of Vladimir Putin will
be fulfilled - to include the entire territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk
regions in the so-called people's republics. The rest of the Russian troops are
engaged in positional battles in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, holding back
the onslaught of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, the annexation
of the territories occupied by Russia is being prepared. By declaring them part
of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin, in the event of de-occupation attempts,
can threaten to use all the means available to the country, including nuclear
weapons.
In Ukraine,
a decision was made to advance in the south. Task number one is to defeat the
Russian group on the right bank of the Dnieper and liberate Kherson. With a
favorable development of events, the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
can be continued to liberate the entire Kherson region, the occupied part of
the Zaporozhye region and access to the Perekop isthmus and the approaches to
Chongar. But even if only Kherson can be liberated by the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, this will be the largest military and political victory for Ukraine
and a heavy defeat for Russia. In particular, plans to annex the Kherson region
will be frustrated: it is impossible to hold a "referendum" at the
gunpoint of Ukrainian HIMARS.
How
successful can the Ukrainian offensive in the south be and how will the
situation develop in the autumn-winter campaign of 2022? In recent weeks, many
articles have appeared in the West arguing that Ukraine cannot win the war with
Russia, and therefore must agree to a settlement of the conflict on Russian
terms; in other words, capitulate. Leaving aside the question of the motivation
of the authors of such statements, some of which may be quite sincerely mistaken,
I will turn to the facts.
In the
first 7–10 days of the war, as a result of the unpreparedness of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine and the political leadership of the country for war, Russian
troops approached Kyiv, Chernigov, Sumy and Kharkov, seized vast territories in
the south. However, by the end of March they were forced out of the
northeastern regions. Moscow announced the battle for the Donbass, which will
decide the fate of the war. Russia's achievements in this "battle"
are not impressive: it took more than three months to reach the borders of the
Lugansk region. Despite the superiority of the Russian troops in armaments,
sometimes multiple, the pace of the offensive turned out to be extremely low,
and the losses were very high. British Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Anthony
Radakin said that during the four and a half months of the war, Russia lost
about 1,700 tanks and 4,400 armored fighting vehicles. This exceeds the data on
the losses of these weapons provided at that time by the Ukrainian military
command.
At the same
time, systemic flaws in the Russian military system were revealed, which cannot
be eliminated in combat conditions. First of all, the Russian armed forces were
lined up like a blitzkrieg army. It was assumed that the airborne divisions and
strike formations would capture the key political and military centers of
Ukraine or the Baltic states (these countries were on the Kremlin’s list of
priority targets), reach the Polish border or even break through to the Vistula
in a few days. Moscow then intended to present NATO with "The Devil’s Alternative":
capitulation or nuclear war. Such ideas predetermined the special role of the
Airborne Forces, consisting of four divisions and four brigades, in planning
future operations and in the structure of the armed forces. An attempt to
capture the airfield in Gostomel in order to land a landing force capable of
capturing Kyiv failed. After that, the Airborne Forces were used (and are being
used) in Ukraine in the most dangerous areas as an elite motorized infantry
and, accordingly, suffer heavy losses. The share of the ground forces, which
bear the brunt of hostilities, has been underestimated in Russia to 28 percent
of the total armed forces (in the Chinese army, for example, the ground forces
account for 50 percent of the personnel). These forces are not enough to
achieve a convincing victory in any lengthy war with the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.
Perhaps,
understanding this circumstance, the Russian command planned, repeating the
experience of the Second World War, powerful tank strikes, breakthroughs in the
enemy’s defenses, encirclement and destruction of his groupings. These plans
remained on paper. The saturation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with modern
light anti-tank weapons devalued the actions of tank units. Javelin missiles
(6,500 of them were delivered to Ukraine) destroyed the tanks before they had
time to reach the distance of aimed fire. The presence of a large number of
man-portable air defense missile systems among the Ukrainian troops made it
possible, to some extent, to neutralize the superiority of Russia in front-line
aviation. As a result, Russian forces have had to rely on missile strikes,
mainly on civilian targets, and "barrage" tactics - massive artillery
raids that wipe out one city block after another from the face of the earth.
High-precision American multiple launch rocket systems, creating serious
logistical difficulties for the Russian army, reduce the effectiveness of
artillery. As a result, in the autumn-winter campaign, Russia's superiority in
arms will, if not reduced to zero, then significantly weakened.
The first
major battles of the new phase of hostilities may begin as early as August,
when Ukrainian troops are expected to move to the offensive on Kherson. It has
a good chance of success for two reasons. Firstly, the supply lines of the
Russian group on the right bank pass through two bridges across the Dnieper:
along the Antonovsky bridge near Kherson and on the other, located next to the
dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station. Both bridges are extremely
vulnerable and will most likely be destroyed by HIMARS strikes before the
offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Secondly, a significant part of the
Russian troops is involved in protracted battles in the Donetsk region. If some
of them are transferred to the south to repel the Ukrainian offensive, then the
task of occupying the entire Donetsk region will certainly not be completed.
Consequently, the main political goal of the "battle for Donbass"
will not be achieved.
The loss of
the right-bank part of the Kherson region may mean the beginning of the failure
of the entire "special military operation." How Moscow will solve the
problem of retaining these lands is not yet clear. One can, however, assume
that such a task has no real solution at all, unless the Kremlin decides to
mobilize the conscripts. But even in this case, it will take a considerable
time, at least one and a half to two months, and by this time the fate of
Kherson will be decided.
The
contours of the first stage of the autumn-winter campaign are seen more or less
clearly: the "battle for Kherson." You can design various scenarios
for the further development of events. But all of them, in fact, come down to
two main options: either Moscow is forced to negotiate on Ukrainian terms (that
is, at least leaves the Ukrainian territories occupied after February 23), or
the war of attrition continues, in which Ukraine will receive a growing
economic and military assistance from Western countries. Given the balance of
power between Russia and the "collective West", Moscow will not be
able to avoid defeat in this war.
Yuri
Fedorov is a military-political expert based in Prague
