BY STEPHEN BLANK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR
Russia’s ongoing development of hypersonic weapons proves
nuclear weapons are in fact warfighting weapons — contrary to conventional
wisdom in the West.
In December 2018, Moscow successfully tested
the Avangard and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles. The former
travels at speeds up to 20 times the speed of sound and is supposedly
invulnerable to any missile defenses. It can carry a nuclear warhead and
allegedly hit any spot on the globe within 30 minutes of launch. Therefore, it
can be considered a “strategic” nuclear weapon.
The Tsirkon, meanwhile,
can be deployed on submarines, ships and airplanes, including long-range
bombers. It possesses a range of approximately 310 miles and is expected to be
a particularly lethal anti-ship weapon.
Another mature Russian hypersonic missile, the Kinzhal,
can travel 1,800 miles at up to 10 times the speed of sound. Russian
President Vladimir Putin displayed it in 2018 in a simulation that modeled the
destruction of Florida.
Moreover, these represent just some of the new generation of
weapons that Moscow is developing. By 2024, Moscow expects its submarine fleet
to be able to launch hypersonic missiles that are capable of carrying either
conventional or nuclear warheads.
Russia’s larger military modernization effort encompasses its
entire triad of air, sea and land-based nuclear weapons, from short- to
intermediate- to long-range nuclear weapons, along with counter-force and
counter-value weapons. According
to General Paul Selva (USAF), vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Russia is also developing new tactical nuclear weapons to tailor its
forces to virtually any contingency. Thus, Russia is currently working on over
20 nuclear programs, including nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons.
Equally disquieting is the fact that in the recent
Vostok-2018 exercises Russian forces and the Ministry of Energy
conducted large-scale exercises to restore electric grids and power supply
after an attack. In other words, Russia rehearsed an EMP (electromagnetic
pulse) operation, and its aftermath strongly suggesting that it either expects
or intends to launch one. Significantly, Moscow sought to conceal the purpose
of that exercise and divorce it from Vostok-18. Russia has also rehearsed
nuclear operations in the past – such as simulating a nuclear strike against Sweden
back in 2013.
Clearly, Moscow sees nuclear weapons as usable instruments of
war. In this context, hypersonics are valuable for the Kremlin because they are
allegedly invulnerable to U.S. missile defenses. Without any basis in fact or
science, Russia has long contended that American missile defenses in the U.S,
Europe and Asia threaten its nuclear deterrent. Despite innumerable briefings,
scientific facts and the admission of Russian experts that these “threats” are
fantasies, the Kremlin persists in seeing nuclear weapons as warfighting
instruments against American and allied missile defenses.
And whatever Moscow declares in its doctrine or rhetoric, its
procurements and exercises strongly suggest not only that, in the Russian view,
nuclear weapons are warfighting weapons, but also that they will be used in a
first-strike against purely conventional strikes. Accordingly, Russian
officials informed then-Secretary
of Defense James Mattis last year that
defending the Baltics would lead to nuclear war — a clear statement of Russia’s
intent to use nuclear weapons first.
At its core, Russia’s development of hypersonic weapons reflects
its refusal to accept mutual assured deterrence among the superpowers and the
self-generating paranoia of a state bent on rebuilding its empire by inhibiting
NATO from defending its allies and partners. They embody both the Kremlin’s
global ambitions and its own inherent paranoia (including the belief that
nuclear weapons can and will be used against it).
Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a
senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, focused on the
geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia. He
is a former professor of Russian National Security Studies and National
Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College. He is also a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War
College.
