I have been reading two books on Churchill at the same time: Churchill: The Power of Words edited by Martin Gilbert and Young Titan: The Making of Winston Churchill by Michael Shelden, when I came across this speech by Churchill given on March 1, 1955, at the time when the MAD doctrine was very much alive. I wonder what he would have said today when the word Deterrent does not apply any more? This observation of his remains as valid today as it was then " We live in an age of great events and little men".
This was the last great speech made by Churchill in the
House of Commons. It was listened to with deep respect and almost total silence
in a packed Chamber. It contains the last of the remembered Churchill phrases
"... safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin
brother of annihilation". The two
final sentences may be regarded as Churchill's farewell to the House of Commons
and to the British people.
I beg to move, 'That this House approves the Statement on
Defence, 1955, Command Paper No. 9391.'
This Motion stands in my name, and it is supported by my
right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
the Minister of Defence.
We live in a period, happily unique in human history,
when the whole world is divided intellectually and to a large extent
geographically between the creeds of Communist discipline and individual
freedom, and when, at the same time, this mental and psychological division is
accompanied by the possession by both sides of the obliterating weapons of the
nuclear age.
We have antagonisms now as deep as those of the
Reformation and its reactions which led to the Thirty Years' War. But now they
are spread over the whole world instead of only over a small part of Europe. We
have, to some extent, the geographical division of the Mongol invasion in the
thirteenth century, only more ruthless and more thorough. We have force and
science, hitherto the servants of man, now threatening to become his master.
I am not pretending to have a solution for a permanent
peace between the nations which could be unfolded this afternoon. We pray for
it. Nor shall I try to discuss the cold war which we all detest, but have to
endure. I shall only venture to offer to the House some observations mainly of
a general character on which I have pondered long and which, I hope, may be
tolerantly received, as they are intended by me. And here may I venture to make
a personal digression? I do not pretend to be an expert or to have technical
knowledge of this prodigious sphere of science. But in my long friendship with
Lord Cherwell I have tried to follow and even predict the evolution of events.
I hope that the House will not reprove me for vanity or conceit if I repeat
what I wrote a quarter of a century ago:
We know enough [I said] to be sure that the scientific
achievements of the next fifty years will be far greater, more rapid and more
surprising than those we have already experienced . . . High authorities tell
us that new sources of power, vastly more important than any we yet know, will
surely be discovered. Nuclear energy is incomparably greater than the molecular
energy which we use to-day. The coal a man can get in a day can easily do 500
times as much work as the man himself. Nuclear energy is at least one million
times more powerful still. If the hydrogen atoms in a pound of water could be
prevailed upon to combine together and form helium, they would suffice to drive
a 1,000 horse-power engine for a whole year. If the electrons those tiny
planets of the atomic systems were induced to combine with the nuclei in the
hydrogen, the horse-power liberated would be 120 times greater still. There is
no question among scientists that this gigantic source of energy exists. What
is lacking is the match to set the bonfire alight, or it may be the detonator
to cause the dynamite to explode.
This is no doubt not quite an accurate description of
what has been discovered, but as it was published in the Strand Magazine of
December, 1931- twenty-four years ago-I hope that my plea to have long taken an
interest in the subject may be indulgently accepted by the House.
What is the present position? Only three countries
possess, in varying degrees, the knowledge and the power to make nuclear
weapons. Of these, the United States is overwhelmingly the chief. Owing to the
breakdown in the exchange of information between us and the United States since
1946 we have had to start again independently on our own. Fortunately,
executive action was taken promptly by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of
the Opposition to reduce as far as possible the delay in our nuclear
development and production. By his initiative we have made our own atomic
bombs.
Confronted with the hydrogen bomb, I have tried to live
up to the right hon. Gentleman's standard. We have started to make that one,
too. It is this grave decision which forms the core of the Defence Paper which
we are discussing this afternoon.
Although the Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs may be
greater than that of Britain, British discoveries may well place us above them
in fundamental science.
May I say that for the sake of simplicity and to avoid
verbal confusion I use the expression 'atomic bombs' and also 'hydrogen bombs'
instead of 'thermo-nuclear' and I keep 'nuclear' for the whole lot. There is an
immense gulf between the atomic and the hydrogen bomb. The atomic bomb, with
all its terrors, did not carry us outside the scope of human control or
manageable events in thought or action, in peace or war. But when Mr. Sterling
Cole, the Chairman of the United States Congressional Committee, gave out a
year ago - 17 February 1954 - the first comprehensive review of the hydrogen
bomb, the entire foundation of human affairs was revolutionized, and mankind
placed in a situation both measureless and laden with doom.
It is now the fact that a quantity of plutonium, probably
less than would fill the Box on the Table-it is quite a safe thing to
store-would suffice to produce weapons which would give indisputable world
domination to any great Power which was the only one to have it. There is no
absolute defence against the hydrogen bomb, nor is any method in sight by which
any nation, or any country, can be completely guaranteed against the
devastating injury which even a score of them might inflict on wide regions.
What ought we to do? Which way shall we turn to save our
lives and the future of the world? It does not matter so much to old people;
they are going soon anyway; but I find it poignant to look at youth in all its
activity and ardour and, most of all, to watch little children playing their
merry games, and wonder what would lie before them if God wearied of mankind.
The best defence would of course be bona fide disarmament
all round. This is in all our hearts. But sentiment must not cloud our vision.
It is often said that 'facts are stubborn things.' A renewed session of a
sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission is now sitting in London and is
rightly attempting to conduct its debates in private. We must not conceal from
ourselves the gulf between the Soviet Government and the N.A.T.O. Powers, which
has hitherto, for so long, prevented an agreement. The long history and
tradition of Russia makes it repugnant to the Soviet Government to accept any
practical system of international inspection.
A second difficulty lies in the circumstance that, just
as the United States, on the one hand, has, we believe, the overwhelming
mastery in nuclear weapons, so the Soviets and their Communist satellites have
immense superiority in what are called 'conventional' forces-the sort of arms
and forces with which we fought the last war, but much improved. The problem
is, therefore, to devise a balanced and phased system of disarmament which at
no period enables any one of the participants to enjoy an advantage which might
endanger the security of the others. A scheme on these lines was submitted last
year by Her Majesty's Government and the French Government and was accepted by
the late Mr. Vyshinsky as a basis of discussion. It is now being examined in
London.
If the Soviet Government have not at any time since the
war shown much nervousness about the American possession of nuclear
superiority, that is because they are quite sure that it will not be used
against them aggressively, even in spite of many forms of provocation. On the
other hand, the N.A.T.O. Powers have been combined together by the continued
aggression and advance of Communism in Asia and in Europe. That this should
have eclipsed in a few years, and largely effaced, the fearful antagonism and
memories that Hitlerism created for the German people is an event without
parallel. But it has, to a large extent, happened. There is widespread belief
throughout the free world that, but for American nuclear superiority, Europe
would already have been reduced to satellite status and the Iron Curtain would
have reached the Atlantic and the Channel.
Unless a trustworthy and universal agreement upon
disarmament, conventional and nuclear alike, can be reached and an effective
system of inspection is established and is actually working, there is only one
sane policy for the free world in the next few years. That is what we call
defence through deterrents. This we have already adopted and proclaimed. These
deterrents may at any time become the parents of disarmament, provided that
they deter. To make our contribution to the deterrent we must ourselves possess
the most up-to-date nuclear weapons, and the means of delivering them.
That is the position which the Government occupy. We are
to discuss this not only as a matter of principle; there are many practical
reasons which should be given. Should war come, which God forbid, there are a
large number of targets that we and the Americans must be able to strike at
once. There are scores of airfields from which the Soviets could launch attacks
with hydrogen bombs as soon as they have the bombers to carry them. It is
essential to our deterrent policy and to our survival to have, with our
American allies, the strength and numbers to be able to paralyse these
potential Communist assaults in the first few hours of the war, should it come.
The House will perhaps note that I avoid using the word
'Russia' as much as possible in this discussion. I have a strong admiration for
the Russian people -for their bravery, their many gifts, and their kindly
nature. It is the Communist dictatorship and the declared ambition of the
Communist Party and their proselytizing activities that we are bound to resist,
and that is what makes this great world cleavage which I mentioned when I
opened my remarks.
There are also big administrative and industrial targets
behind the Iron Curtain, and any effective deterrent policy must have the power
to paralyse them all at the outset, or shortly after. There are also the Soviet
submarine bases and other naval targets which will need early attention. Unless
we make a contribution of our own-that is the point which I am pressing-we
cannot be sure that in an emergency the resources of other Powers would be
planned exactly as we would wish, or that the targets which would threaten us
most would be given what we consider the necessary priority, or the deserved
priority, in the first few hours.
These targets might be of such cardinal importance that
it would really be a matter of life and death for us. All this, I think, must be
borne in mind in deciding our policy about the conventional forces, to which I
will come later, the existing Services.
Meanwhile, the United States has many times the nuclear
power of Soviet Russia - I avoid any attempt to give exact figures and they have,
of course, far more effective means of delivery. Our moral and military support
of the United States and our possession of nuclear weapons of the highest
quality and on an appreciable scale, together with their means of delivery,
will greatly reinforce the deterrent power of the free world, and will
strengthen our influence within the free world. That, at any rate, is the
policy we have decided to pursue. That is what we are now doing, and I am
thankful that it is endorsed by a mass of responsible opinion on both sides of
the House, and, I believe, by the great majority of the nation.
A vast quantity of information, some true, some
exaggerated much out of proportion, has been published about the hydrogen bomb.
The truth has inevitably been mingled with fiction, and I am glad to say that
panic has not occurred. Panic would not necessarily make for peace. That is one
reason why I have been most anxious that responsible discussions on this matter
should not take place on the B.B.C. or upon the television, and I thought that
I was justified in submitting that view of Her Majesty's Government to the
authorities, which they at once accepted-very willingly accepted.
Panic would not necessarily make for peace even in this
country. There are many countries where a certain wave of opinion may arise and
swing so furiously into action that decisive steps may be taken from which
there is no recall. As it is, the world population goes on its daily journey
despite its sombre impression and earnest longing for relief. That is the way
we are going on now.
I shall content myself with saying about the power of
this weapon, the hydrogen bomb, that apart from all the statements about blast
and heat effects over increasingly wide areas there are now to be considered
the consequences of "fall out” as it is called, of wind-borne radio-active
particles. There is both an immediate direct el feet on human beings who are in
the path of such a cloud and an indirect effect through animals, grass, and
vegetables, which pass on these contagions to human beings through food.
This would confront many who escaped the direct effects
of the explosion with poisoning, or starvation, or both. Imagination stands
appalled. There are, of course, the palliatives and precautions of a courageous
Civil Defence, and about that the Home Secretary will be speaking later on
to-night. But our best protection lies, as I am sure the House will be
convinced, in successful deterrents operating from a foundation of sober, calm,
and tireless vigilance.
Moreover, a curious paradox has emerged. Let me put it
simply. After a certain point has been passed it may be said. "The worse
things get, the better”.
The broad effect of the latest developments is to spread
almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of mortal danger.
This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Soviet Russia by putting her
enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality or near-equality of
vulnerability with our small densely populated island and with Western Europe.
I cannot regard this development as adding to our
dangers. We have reached the maximum already. On the contrary, to this form of
attack continents are vulnerable as well as islands. Hitherto, crowded
countries, as I have said, like the United Kingdom and Western Europe, have had
this outstanding vulnerability to carry. But the hydrogen bomb, with its vast
range of destruction and the even wider area of contamination, would be
effective also against nations whose population, hitherto, has been so widely
dispersed over large land areas as to make them feel that they were not in any
danger at all.
They, too, become highly vulnerable: not yet equally
perhaps, but, still, highly and increasingly vulnerable. Here again we see the
value of deterrents, immune against surprise and well understood by all persons
on both sides I repeat "on both sides" who have the power to control
events. That is why I have hoped for a long time for a top level conference
where these matters could be put plainly and bluntly from one friendly visitor
to the conference to another.
Then it may well be that we shall by a process of sublime
irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child
of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. Although the
Americans have developed weapons capable of producing all the effects I have
mentioned, we believe that the Soviets so far have tested by explosion only a
type of bomb of intermediate power.
There is no reason why, however, they should not develop
some time within the next four, three, or even two years more advanced weapons
and full means to deliver them on North American targets. Indeed, there is
every reason to believe that within that period they will. In trying to look
ahead like this we must be careful ourselves to avoid the error of comparing
the present state of our preparations with the stage which the Soviets may
reach in three or four years' time. It is a major error of thought to contrast
the Soviet position three or four years hence with our own position to-day. It
is a mistake to do this, either in the comparatively precise details of
aircraft development or in the measureless sphere of nuclear weapons.
The threat of hydrogen attack on these islands lies in
the future. It is not with us now. According to the information that I have
been able to obtain I have taken every opportunity to consult all the highest
authorities at our disposal-the only country which is able to deliver to-day a
full-scale nuclear attack with hydrogen bombs at a few hours' notice is the
United States. That surely is an important fact, and from some points of view
and to some of us it is not entirely without comfort.
It is conceivable that Soviet Russia, fearing a nuclear
attack before she has caught up with the United States and created deterrents
of her own, as she might argue that they are, might attempt to bridge the gulf
by a surprise attack with such nuclear weapons as she has already. American
superiority in nuclear weapons, reinforced by Britain, must, therefore, be so
organized as to make it clear that no such surprise attack would prevent
immediate retaliation on a far larger scale. This is an essential of the
deterrent policy.
For this purpose, not only must the nuclear superiority
of the Western Powers be stimulated in every possible way, but their means of
delivery of bombs must be expanded, improved, and varied. It is even probable,
though we have not been told about it outside the N.A.T.O. sphere, that a great
deal of this has been already done by the United States. We should aid them in
every possible way. I will not attempt to go into details, but it is known that
bases have been and are being established in as many parts of the world as
possible and that over all the rest the United States Strategic Air Force,
which is in itself a deterrent of the highest order, is in ceaseless readiness.
The Soviet Government probably knows, in general terms,
of the policy that is being pursued, and of the present United States strength
and our own growing addition to it. Thus, they should be convinced that a
surprise attack could not exclude immediate retaliation. As one might say to
them, 'Although you might kill millions of our peoples, and cause widespread
havoc by a surprise attack, we could, within a few hours of this outrage,
certainly deliver several, indeed many times the weight of nuclear material
which you have used, and continue retaliation on that same scale.'
'We have,' we could say, 'already hundreds of bases for
attack from all angles and have made an intricate study of suitable targets.'
Thus, it seems to me with some experience of wartime talks, you might go to
dinner and have a friendly evening. I should not be afraid to talk things over
as far as they can be. This, and the hard facts, would make the deterrent
effective.
I must make one admission, and any admission is
formidable. The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in
the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dug-out. That is a blank.
Happily, we may find methods of protecting ourselves, if we were all agreed,
against that.
All these considerations lead me to believe that, on a
broad view, the Soviets would be ill-advised to embark on major aggression
within the next three or four years.
One must always consider the interests of other people
when you are facing a particular situation. Their interests may be the only
guide that is available. We may calculate, therefore, that world war will not
break out within that time. If, at the end of that time, there should be a
supreme conflict, the weapons which I have described this afternoon would be
available to both sides, and it would be folly to suppose that they would not
be used. Our precautionary dispositions and preparations must, therefore, be
based on the assumption that, if war should come, these weapons would be used.
I repeat, therefore, that during the next three or four
years the free world should, and will, retain an overwhelming superiority in
hydrogen weapons. During that period it is most unlikely that the Russians
would deliberately embark on major war or attempt a surprise attack, either of
which would bring down upon them at once a crushing weight of nuclear
retaliation. In three or four years' time, it may be even less, the scene will
be changed. The Soviets will probably stand possessed of hydrogen bombs and the
means of delivering them not only on the United Kingdom but also on North
American targets. They may then have reached a stage, not indeed of parity with
the United States and Britain but of what is called 'saturation.'
I must explain this term of art. 'Saturation' in this
connection means the point where, although one Power is stronger than the
other, perhaps much stronger, both are capable of inflicting crippling or
quasi-mortal injury on the other with what they have got. It does not follow,
however, that the risk of war will then be greater. Indeed, it is arguable that
it will be less, for both sides will then realize that global war would result
in mutual annihilation.
Major war of the future will differ, therefore, from
anything we have known in the past in this one significant respect; that each
side, at the outset, will suffer what it dreads the most, the loss of
everything that it has ever known of. The deterrents will grow continually in
value. In the past, an aggressor has been tempted by the hope of snatching an
early advantage. In future, he may be deterred by the knowledge that the other
side has the certain power to inflict swift, inescapable, and crushing
retaliation. Of course, we should all agree that a world-wide international
agreement on disarmament is the goal at which we should aim. The Western
democracies disarmed themselves at the end of the war. The Soviet Government
did not disarm, and the Western nations were forced to rearm, though only
partially, after the Soviets and Communists had dominated all China and half
Europe. That is the present position. It is easy, of course, for the Communists
to say now, 'Let us ban all nuclear weapons.' Communist ascendancy in
conventional weapons would then become overwhelming. That might bring peace,
but only peace in the form of the subjugation of the Free World to the
Communist system.
I shall not detain the House very much longer, and I am
sorry to be so long. The topic is very intricate. I am anxious to repeat and to
emphasize the one word which is the theme of my remarks, namely, 'Deterrent.'
That is the main theme.
The hydrogen bomb has made an astounding incursion into
the structure of our lives and thoughts. Its impact is prodigious and profound,
but I do not agree with those who say, 'Let us sweep away forthwith all our
existing defence services and concentrate our energy and resources on nuclear
weapons and their immediate ancillaries.' The policy of the deterrent cannot
rest on nuclear weapons alone. We must, together with our N.A.T.O. allies,
maintain the defensive shield in Western Europe.
Unless the N.A.T.O. powers had effective forces there on
the ground and could make a front, there would be nothing to prevent piecemeal
advance and encroachment by the Communists in this time of so-called peace. By
successive infiltrations, the Communists could progressively undermine the
security of Europe. Unless we were prepared to unleash a full-scale nuclear war
as soon as some local incident occurs in some distant country, we must have
conventional forces in readiness to deal with such situations as they arise.
We must, therefore, honour our undertaking to maintain
our contribution to the N.A.T.O. forces in Europe in time of peace. In war,
this defensive shield would be of vital importance, for we must do our utmost
to hold the Soviet and satellite forces at arms' length in order to prevent
short-range air and rocket attack on these islands. Thus, substantial strength
in conventional forces has still a vital part to play in the policy of the
deterrent. It is perhaps of even greater importance in the cold war.
Though world war may be prevented by the deterrent power
of nuclear weapons, the Communists may well resort to military action in
furtherance of their policy of infiltration and encroachment in many parts of
the world. There may well be limited wars on the Korean model, with limited
objectives. We must be able to play our part in these, if called upon by the
United Nations organization. In the conditions of to-day, this is also an
aspect of our Commonwealth responsibility. We shall need substantial strength
in conventional forces to fulfil our world-wide obligations in these days of
uneasy peace and extreme bad temper.
To sum up this part of the argument, of course, the
development of nuclear weapons will affect the shape and organization of the
Armed Forces and also of Civil Defence. We have entered a period of transition
in which the past and the future will overlap. But it is an error to suppose
that, because of these changes our traditional forces can be cast away or
superseded. The tasks of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in this transition
period are set forth with clarity in the Defence White Paper. The means by
which these duties will be met are explained in more detail in the Departmental
Papers which have been laid before the House by the three Service Ministers.
No doubt, nothing is perfect; certainly, nothing is
complete, but, considering that these arrangements have been made in the first
year after the apparition of the hydrogen bomb, the far-seeing and progressive
adaptability which is being displayed by all three Services is remarkable.
[Hon. Members: 'Oh.'] I understand that there is to be a Motion of censure.
Well, certainly, nothing could be more worthy of censure than to try to use the
inevitable administrative difficulties of the transitional stage as a utensil
of party politics and would-be electioneering. I am not saying that anyone is
doing it; we shall see when it comes to the vote.
The future shape of Civil Defence is also indicated in
broad outline in the Defence White Paper. This outline will be filled in as the
preparation of the new plans proceeds, but the need for an effective system of
Civil Defence is surely beyond dispute. It presents itself to-day in its
noblest aspect, namely, the Christian duty of helping fellow-mortals in
distress. Rescue, salvage, and ambulance work have always been the core of
Civil Defence, and no city, no family nor any honourable man or woman can
repudiate this duty and accept from others help which they are not prepared to
fit themselves to render in return. If war comes, great numbers may be relieved
of their duty by death, but none must deny it as long as they live. If they do,
they might perhaps be put in what is called 'Coventry.' [Laughter.] I am
speaking of the tradition, and not of any particular locality.
The argument which I have been endeavouring to unfold and
consolidate gives us in this island an interlude. Let us not waste it. Let us
hope we shall use it to augment or at least to prolong our security and that of
mankind. But how? There are those who believe, or at any rate say, 'If we have
the protection of the overwhelmingly powerful United States, we need not make
the hydrogen bomb for ourselves or build a fleet of bombers for its delivery.
We can leave that to our friends across the ocean. Our contribution should be
criticism of any unwise policy into which they may drift or plunge. We should
throw our hearts and consciences into that.'
Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much
influence over their policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are largely
dependent, as we are to-day, upon their protection. We, too, must possess
substantial deterrent power of our own. We must also never allow, above all, I
hold, the growing sense of unity and brotherhood between the United Kingdom and
the United States and throughout the English-speaking world to be injured or
retarded. Its maintenance, its stimulation, and its fortifying is one of the first
duties of every person who wishes to see peace in the world and wishes to see
the survival of this country.
To conclude: mercifully, there is time and hope if we
combine patience and courage. All deterrents will improve and gain authority
during the next ten years. By that time, the deterrent may well reach its acme
and reap its final reward. The day may dawn when fair play, love for one's
fellow-men, respect for justice and freedom, will enable tormented generations
to march forth serene and triumphant from the hideous epoch in which we have to
dwell. Meanwhile, never flinch, never weary, never despair.
