Here is a link to a speech of his on my blog from 2014:
A predominantly one-topic blog: how is it that the most imminent and lethal implication for humankind - the fact that the doctrine of "Mutually Assured Destruction" will not work with Iran - is not being discussed in our media? Until it is recognized that MAD is dead, the Iranian threat will be treated as a threat only to Israel and not as the global threat which it in fact is. A blog by Mladen Andrijasevic
Translate
Saturday, January 27, 2018
Czech president Miloš Zeman wins second five-year term. Here is why he won:
Here is a link to a speech of his on my blog from 2014:
Monday, January 22, 2018
Saturday, January 20, 2018
We’re being bamboozled
Jerusalem
Post Letters to the Editor, January 21, 2018
With regard to “Trump cuts UNRWA funding in half” (January 17), how long are we going to permit ourselves to be bamboozled by UNRWA when, according to Dr. Daniel Pipes, 99% percent of “Palestine refugees” are fake? In his January 10 blog entry, Dr. Pipes writes: “And even if no one replaced US donations, denying UNRWA money does not get to the heart of the problem, which lies not in its sponsored activities but in its perpetuating and expanding population of “Palestine refugees” in three unique, even bizarre ways: allowing this status to be transferred without limit from generation to generation; maintaining the status after refugees have acquired a nationality (such as Jordanian); and assigning the status to residents of the West Bank and Gaza, who live in the putative Palestinian homeland. These tricks allowed UNRWA artificially to expand the refugee population from 600,000 in 1949 to 5.3 million now; an accurate count of real refugees now alive numbers around 20,000.”
MLADEN ANDRIJASEVIC
Beersheba
With regard to “Trump cuts UNRWA funding in half” (January 17), how long are we going to permit ourselves to be bamboozled by UNRWA when, according to Dr. Daniel Pipes, 99% percent of “Palestine refugees” are fake? In his January 10 blog entry, Dr. Pipes writes: “And even if no one replaced US donations, denying UNRWA money does not get to the heart of the problem, which lies not in its sponsored activities but in its perpetuating and expanding population of “Palestine refugees” in three unique, even bizarre ways: allowing this status to be transferred without limit from generation to generation; maintaining the status after refugees have acquired a nationality (such as Jordanian); and assigning the status to residents of the West Bank and Gaza, who live in the putative Palestinian homeland. These tricks allowed UNRWA artificially to expand the refugee population from 600,000 in 1949 to 5.3 million now; an accurate count of real refugees now alive numbers around 20,000.”
MLADEN ANDRIJASEVIC
Beersheba
Saturday, January 13, 2018
WSJ: Trump’s Iran Gamble
The Wall Street
Journal
He issues a red line to rewrite the nuclear deal or reimpose sanctions.
By The Editorial Board
President Trump said Friday that he’s waiving sanctions
related to the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal—for the last time. In essence he
issued an ultimatum to Congress and Europe to revise the agreement or the U.S.
will reimpose sanctions and walk away. His distaste for the nuclear deal is
right, but the risk is that Mr. Trump is boxing himself in more than he is the
Iranians.
Mr. Trump said
in a statement that he is waving sanctions, “but only in order to secure our
European allies’ agreement to fix the terrible flaws of the Iran nuclear deal.”
He added: “This is a last chance. In the absence of such an agreement, the
United States will not again waive sanctions in order to stay in the Iran
nuclear deal. And if at any time I judge that such an agreement is not within
reach, I will withdraw from the deal immediately. No one should doubt my word.”
That’s called
a red line, and it means that if his terms aren’t met within 120 days, Mr.
Trump will have to follow through or damage his global credibility. Presidents
should be careful about putting themselves in box canyons unless they have a
clear idea of a way out and what his next steps are.
Does Mr. Trump
know? It isn’t obvious. Mr. Trump rightly focuses on the core faults of the
accord: major provisions start sunsetting after 2023; the failure to include
Iran’s ballistic-missile programs; and inadequate inspections. He wants the
European allies that also negotiated the deal—France, Germany and the United
Kingdom—to rewrite it with the U.S.
But Iran is
sure to resist, and so will China and Russia. French, British and German
companies already have billions in business deals invested or being negotiated
with Iran, and their political leaders will be loathe to jeopardize them.
European leaders have been embarrassingly quiet amid the anti-regime protests
in Iran. European Union foreign-policy chief Federica Mogherini hosted the
foreign ministers of Britain, Germany, France and Iran this week. They
expressed support for the deal and said little about Tehran’s protest crackdown.
If the
Europeans resist a nuclear renegotiation, Mr. Trump would then have to act
alone with U.S. sanctions. While those are potent, to be effective they will
have to target non-U.S. companies that do business with Iran, including our
friends in Europe.
Some fear Iran
would use reimposed U.S. sanctions as an excuse to walk away from the deal and
rush to build a bomb, but we doubt it. The more likely scenario is that Iran
will continue to court European business and try to divide the U.S. from its
allies and block a new antinuclear coalition. The mullahs will claim to be
abiding by the deal even as the U.S. has walked away.
On Friday Mr.
Trump also challenged Congress to strengthen the nuclear deal’s terms under
U.S. law, most likely by amending the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.
This will require 60 votes in the Senate, which means Democratic support. This
will test the sincerity of Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, who opposed the deal.
But in today’s polarized Washington, partisanship no longer stops at the
water’s edge. Mr. Trump won’t persuade Europe if he can’t persuade Congress.
The question
all of this raises, as British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson put it Thursday,
is what is the policy alternative policy to the nuclear deal. The answer is
containment with a goal of regime change. The people of Iran have again showed
their displeasure with the regime, and the world should support them. We’d back
such a strategy, but it isn’t clear that this is Mr. Trump’s emerging policy,
or that he and his advisers know how to go about it.
The Treasury
Department is moving ahead with sanctions against Iran for its ballistic
missiles, including 14 more individuals and entities “in connection with
serious human rights abuses and censorship in Iran.” The targets include the
head of Iran’s judiciary and the cyber units trying to prevent protesters from
organizing and accessing reliable news. But Mr. Trump has been reluctant to
counteract Iran’s adventurism in Syria or Iraq, and a policy of regime change
can’t be half-baked.
All of this is an enormous undertaking for an Administration already coping
with the nuclear and ballistic threat from North Korea. The safer strategy
would have been to keep waiving sanctions and let the nuclear deal continue
while building support to contain and undermine Iran on other fronts. Mr. Trump
can now say he has followed through on his campaign vow on Iran, but building a
better strategy will take discipline and much harder work.
Darkest Hour vs. Five Days in London, May 1940
It may seem at first glance that this review has nothing
to do with Iran. But we are almost at
the same point as in May 1940
By Mladen
Andrijasevic on January 13, 2018
Anthony McCarten has
written an excellent book, well researched with extensive quotes from
Churchill’s speeches and other sources, but I still disagree with his basic
premise that on Sunday, May 26, 1940, during the third War Cabinet meeting
between 5:00 pm and 6:30 pm, actually during the first 15 minutes of that Cabinet
meeting for which there is no official record, Churchill came very close to
accepting negotiations with Hitler. I read John Lukacs’s Five Days in London,
May 1940, and compared it day by day to the account in Darkest Hour and John
Lukacs’s interpretation to me is more credible.
In McCarten’s book I see no explanation as to what changed Churchill’s mind and strengthened his resolve from May 26, 1940 to May 27, 1940, which culminated with Churchill winning over the extended cabinet of 25 MPs on May 28 at his office at the House of Commons at 6:30 pm.
There is also no mention in McCarten’s book of two important facts. First, on May 24 at 11:42 a.m., Hitler issued the halt order, sent in clear, and instantly read in London, which stopped the advance towards Dunkirk and did not rescind it until late May 26, so on May 26, at 5 p.m. when the crucial meeting took place, Churchill already knew that there was a chance to use this pause to help evacuate the troops and indeed the order to initiate operation Dynamo was given a few hours after the fall of Calais the same day, whereas by May 27 the German tanks had continued their advance. So why would Churchill have been more resolute on May 27 than on May 26?
Second, the chiefs of staff came up with a paper on May 25 entitled “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality “, which [from Lukacs’s Five Days in London, May 1940, page 107] ‘presumed the worst possible conditions - and, by 25 May, and increasingly plausible situation: the French making peace with Germany, Italy entering the war, Europe and French North Africa under German control and the loss of most of the British Expeditionary Force still struggling in northern France and Belgium . Still – even in these conditions Britain could hold out, if the United States would support Britain increasingly, eventually entering the war, and if the Royal Air Force, together with the navy, would remain in control over Britain and thus “prevent Germany from carrying out a serious seaborne invasion “’.
I personally believe that one of the main reasons Churchill did not give in is that in contrast to all the political class of the day (and almost all of the political elites of today), he knew whom he was dealing with. He knew what his enemy believed in. He had read Hitler’s Mein Kampf – “ the new Koran of faith and war”. [from The Gathering Storm, VOL 1 of The Second World War, page 26]. He knew what to expect from Hitler.
In McCarten’s book I see no explanation as to what changed Churchill’s mind and strengthened his resolve from May 26, 1940 to May 27, 1940, which culminated with Churchill winning over the extended cabinet of 25 MPs on May 28 at his office at the House of Commons at 6:30 pm.
There is also no mention in McCarten’s book of two important facts. First, on May 24 at 11:42 a.m., Hitler issued the halt order, sent in clear, and instantly read in London, which stopped the advance towards Dunkirk and did not rescind it until late May 26, so on May 26, at 5 p.m. when the crucial meeting took place, Churchill already knew that there was a chance to use this pause to help evacuate the troops and indeed the order to initiate operation Dynamo was given a few hours after the fall of Calais the same day, whereas by May 27 the German tanks had continued their advance. So why would Churchill have been more resolute on May 27 than on May 26?
Second, the chiefs of staff came up with a paper on May 25 entitled “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality “, which [from Lukacs’s Five Days in London, May 1940, page 107] ‘presumed the worst possible conditions - and, by 25 May, and increasingly plausible situation: the French making peace with Germany, Italy entering the war, Europe and French North Africa under German control and the loss of most of the British Expeditionary Force still struggling in northern France and Belgium . Still – even in these conditions Britain could hold out, if the United States would support Britain increasingly, eventually entering the war, and if the Royal Air Force, together with the navy, would remain in control over Britain and thus “prevent Germany from carrying out a serious seaborne invasion “’.
I personally believe that one of the main reasons Churchill did not give in is that in contrast to all the political class of the day (and almost all of the political elites of today), he knew whom he was dealing with. He knew what his enemy believed in. He had read Hitler’s Mein Kampf – “ the new Koran of faith and war”. [from The Gathering Storm, VOL 1 of The Second World War, page 26]. He knew what to expect from Hitler.
https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R284HJDHGWC8VN/ref=cm_cr_srp_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN=B06XZMHNSG
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)