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| A satellite view of Iran's Fordow nuclear plant |
By YONAH JEREMY BOB
Until May 2019, most estimates had Iran at about 12
months away from having enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.
How could it leap forward to have enough uranium to have
a weapon in only two months?
Olli Heinonen, former deputy director-general for
safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency, has told The Jerusalem
Post that, “If the recent performance numbers, average enrichment levels, and
current inventories quoted by [Iran Atomic Energy Organization Director Ali
Akbar] Salehi hold, the breakout time by the end of January will be around two
months.”
How does Heinonen make this calculation?
About 1,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium is enough
to be converted into 25 kg. of weaponized uranium, which is enough for a
nuclear bomb.
As of an IAEA November 11 report looking backward, the
Islamic Republic was still only at about 372 kg., but had already increased its
output of enriched uranium by more than one-third.
By December 23, Heinonen estimated that Tehran had
already accumulated hundreds more kilograms of enriched uranium.
Part of this assumption is based on the IAEA November
report’s flagging that Iran had reinstalled a cascade of 164 IR-4 centrifuges
and one of 164 IR-2m centrifuges.”
The IR-2m centrifuges are five times as efficient as the
around 5,000 standard IR-1 centrifuges which have been the Islamic republic’s
main platform for enriching uranium.
So even before the Islamic Republic’s announcement on
Sunday that it was abandoning any limits on uranium enrichment, the breakout
time could have been down to as low as six months (though some would say it was
still closer to 10 months.)
In and of itself, that announcement, without any follow
through, is more symbolic than anything else.
Heinonen noted that Iranian officials have said they will
install more advanced centrifuges in the underground Fordow nuclear facility.
He said that 1,000 IR-2ms could be installed at Fordow.
This would double Iran’s enrichment capacity.
Once you are sitting at only six months away and you can
double your enrichment capacity, getting to two months away from enough
enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb is not that hard.
Heinonen also believes that Tehran is succeeding with
more IR-4 centrifuges which are even more efficient than the IR-2ms, and which
many estimates of breakout time ignore.
So the big question is whether Iran reinstalls
centrifuges it had detached and in what volume.
Even if the Islamic Republic fulfills Heinonen’s fears,
it does not mean that: 1) it will continue to get to the 1,000 km. enriched
uranium level; 2) that it will convert that low enriched uranium to weaponized
uranium; and 3) that it will be able to deliver a nuclear bomb via a missile.
But even the possibility that Tehran could suddenly move
forward to a bomb using advanced centrifuges much faster than it could have
some years ago will be keeping the US and Israeli defense establishments up at
night and busy with putting in place contingency plans.
