The
Jerusalem Post
By YAAKOV KATZ
The missiles will come
in low, after being in the air for almost an hour, and when they hit, they will
be coming just over the horizon. People who witness the attack will remember
later that the missiles didn’t fall from the sky. They flew at their target straight,
like a bullet.
The drones will hit just
a few minutes later. They will have been flying at low altitudes for longer,
taking off in Iraq, crossing into Syria, and then across the border into
Israel.
The “swarm” of drones
and cruise missiles – as it will later be referred to – will have caught the
country by surprise. By the time they strike, the target will be less relevant
– the Haifa oil refinery, an apartment building in Kiryat Shmona, or a school
in Katzrin.
This scenario, while
fiction for now, is one that the IDF top brass is talking about on a regular
basis these days. It is being played out in the minds of IDF generals and
intelligence officials, responsible for watching Iran’s every move, from Tehran
all the way to its proxies’ bases in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and the Gaza Strip.
The model is very
similar to Iran’s attack against the Aramco oil facility in Saudi Arabia in September: within the span
of 17 minutes, 18 drones and three low-flying missiles hit the facility with
amazing precision. The ability to launch a coordinated cruise missile/drone
attack that hit its target with precision (except for a few cruise missiles
that missed) was an impressive feat. That Iran has this capability came as a
surprise to many in America and Israel’s defense establishments.
That Iran would like to
attack Israel is not a secret. Two weeks ago, an Iranian-backed militia in
Syria fired four Fajr-5 rockets at the Hermon Mountain in Israel. The rockets
were intercepted by Iron Dome batteries.
In August, Israel struck
an Iranian-backed cell planning to launch explosives-laden drones into Israel
from Syria. After both incidents, the Israeli Air Force carried out extensive
retaliatory strikes against Iranian targets in Syria.
But what happens if Iran
succeeds in hitting Israel with an Aramco-style attack? What happens if it hits
a strategic installation and causes extensive economic damage or worse – loss
of life? What will Israel do?
This question is at the
heart of discussions within the defense establishment, and there are a number
of possible answers, each with its advantages and disadvantages.
IF FOR example the
cruise missiles and drones are launched from Syria, Yemen or Iraq, the easiest
move is for Israel to simply retaliate against the cell that launched them,
assuming it is able to quickly locate and identify the attackers.
On the other hand, while
such a retaliation has tactical value – denying the cell the ability to
continue firing missiles – what does it say about Israeli deterrence? If Iran
knows that it can strike at Israel via proxies from other countries and not pay
a direct price, what will stop it from continuing?
For that reason, another
option would be for Israel to strike back directly at Iran and to deliver a
decisive blow against the regime that would make the clerics there understand
that there is a personal price to be paid for attacking Israel.
How would Israel do
that?
Israel will likely need
to rely on its Air Force, the backbone of which – the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters, F-16I Sufas and F-15I Raams – are specially configured for long-range
bombing operations.
With some refueling, the
planes would be able to fly to Iran, attack their targets and return. There are
different routes: flying directly over Jordan and Iraq, over Saudi Arabia and
Iraq, or along the Turkish-Syrian border. All have their advantages and
disadvantages. Some are longer while others are more dangerous.
Israel could potentially
use drones in such an attack. According to foreign reports, the Heron TP –
Israel’s largest drone with the wingspan of a Boeing 707 – has the ability to
carry missiles. How big and how much damage they can cause remains unknown.
That is why while the drones – if they are even an option – might minimize the
risk to pilots, their ability to cause extensive damage is limited.
For this reason, for
example, Avigdor Liberman when he was defense minister, and Naftali Bennett
before he became defense minister, both pushed for the IDF to develop
additional long-range capabilities. Liberman tried to establish a missile corps
in the IDF. At the time, the focus was on short-to-medium range that was not
big enough to reach Iran, but that would have been the next stage.
Prior to being appointed
defense minister, Bennett also raised the issue in security cabinet meetings
and tried to push the military to think creatively about how it can deal
decisive blows to far away enemies like Iran. Now, as defense minister, he can
try to implement his vision.
EACH RETALIATORY option
will directly impact the scope of the conflict that will follow. If, for
example, Israel goes with option 1 and limits its strike to the missile
launchers in Iraq, Syria or Yemen, there would likely be almost no response.
Iran would understand that Israel needed to vent and would accept the follow-up
blow.
If Israel goes with
option 2 and strikes in Iran, an unprecedented move, it could lead to a
regional war. Iran can activate its militias based in Syria, Islamic Jihad in
the Gaza Strip and, of course, Hezbollah in Lebanon which has the ability to
launch over 1,000 rockets and missiles a day against Israeli targets.
In theory, Iran also has
the potential to launch its own long-range ballistic missiles toward Israel.
While Iran has developed an impressive ballistic missile capability, they have
never really been tested in combat. Will they be able to make the flight to
Israel and accurately hit their targets? Maybe, maybe not. Either way, they
would first have to make it through the Arrow, Israel’s ballistic missile
defense system.
What would Israel target
in such an attack against Iran? For purposes of deterrence, it might be enough
to strike at a single symbolic target, like a military base. On the other hand,
if you know that a massive war is coming, maybe it would be the right time to
strike additional targets at the same time – nuclear facilities, missile depots
and launchers, air force bases, navy ships. If there is already going to be a
war, it might as well be worth it.
The same could be argued
about Hezbollah. If the military assessment is that Hezbollah would attack
Israel after such a strike, then the IDF would need to consider launching a
preemptive strike against Hezbollah and hitting targets – its long-range
missile arsenal, assuming Israeli intelligence knows where it is stored as an
example - at the same time that an attack is launched against Iran. At least
this way, if war with Hezbollah comes, Israel will have limited the
Lebanese-based group’s ability to inflict damage.
WILL ANY of this happen?
That is impossible to know. Based on the frequency of visits by top US military officials in the last few weeks - Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, head of the US Air Force Gen. David Goldfein,
and CENTCOM chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie were all here last month – there is
coordination going on behind the scenes between the Pentagon and the IDF.
The same can be
understood from the two phone calls Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently
had with President Donald Trump, during which they discussed the threat from
Iran as well as other “critical” regional issues.
The problem, though, is
that anything Netanyahu does today will be seen as politically driven. If there
is an attack in the coming weeks after Israel has gone to another election, then
however Israel responds will be looked at through the prism of Netanyahu’s
legal predicament. Did he decide to go to war to try and postpone his trial, or
did he decide to contain a devastating attack to avoid a war that would incur
casualties and possibly also a political price?
In the back of
everyone’s mind there will be a constant and nagging question mark over what
happens next. Everyone that is, except for Iran.
