Alan Dershowitz in Newsmax
brings an unexpected perspective to the discussion on the inapplicability of
MAD with regards to Iran .
However, I believe Dershowitz is wrong and that the death of MAD is due not to the Israelis being ethically incapable of
actually launching a nuclear counter attack at Iran but
because Iran
could not care less if they did.
Why
Deterrence Won’t Work Against Iran
By
Alan Dershowitz
Alan M. Dershowitz's
Perspective: Following President
Obama’s strong renunciation of “containment” and his expression of willingness
to use military force as a last resort to prevent Iran from
developing nuclear weapons, some on the left continue to oppose any threat to
use the military option.
Leading this approach is Fareed Zakaria, who recently on his CNN program, characterized the Obama policy as “a serious error,” and called instead for a “robust policy of containment and deterrence.”
Leading this approach is Fareed Zakaria, who recently on his CNN program, characterized the Obama policy as “a serious error,” and called instead for a “robust policy of containment and deterrence.”
But the policy that Zakaria is proposing is
anything but robust. To the contrary, it is a call for inaction. It presumed
that Iran
will be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, but that it will be deterred from
actually using them by the threat of nuclear retaliation.
Zakaria points to the fact that deterrence succeeded in preventing war between theUnited States and the
Soviet Union, as well as between India
and Pakistan .
He claims that each side was effectively deterred by the threat of mutually
assured destruction. He says it will work equally well with Iran .
Let us pause for a moment to understand precisely what a policy of deterrence entails. Any such policy is based on the promise that if one side launches a nuclear attack, the other side will retaliate with an equally devastating nuclear attack, thus assuring the destruction of both societies and the deaths of millions of innocent civilians.
The first question therefore is whether theUnited
States would actually be willing to retaliate against a
nuclear attack on Israel by
dropping nuclear bombs on Tehran ,
killing millions of its civilian inhabitants. The second question is whether
any civilized country — the United States
or Israel — should be
willing to kill millions of Iranian civilians because their leaders made a
decision to use nuclear weapons against Israel
or the United States .
The third question — and the one never asked by advocates of deterrence — is whether it would be legal under the laws of war to target millions of civilians in a retaliatory nuclear attack.
These are the kinds of questions that Fareed Zakaria and his dovish colleagues refuse to ask. And the reason they refuse to ask these hard questions is precisely because we know the answers they would give: They would be categorically opposed to any retaliatory attack that targeted civilians in a tit-for-tat implementation of a mutually assured destruction policy of deterrence.
If you don’t believe me, ask him!
As to the legality of nuclear deterrence, the International Court of Justice issued a decision in1996,
in a case challenging the lawfulness of using, or
threatening to use, nuclear weapons. The majority decision declined “to
pronounce . . . on the practice known as ‘the policy of deterrence.’” It did
rule unanimously, however, that any “threat or use of nuclear weapons” must “be
compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed
conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international
humanitarian law . . . ”
These rules, of course, generally forbid the targeting of civilian population centers and require proportionality even in the bombing of military targets. Since nuclear weapons are, by their nature, virtually incapable of destroying military targets without also inflicting countless civilian casualties, it would seem to follow that they could not be used except against remote military targets, such as ships and submarines on the high seas, or armies in isolated deserts or mountains. In a divided vote, the court ruled that:
• “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict…”
• “However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.”
In other words, it would be unlawful for the United States to threaten or use nuclear weapons as a deterrent, since its “very survival” would not be at stake, but it might be lawful for Israel to do so because it is a small state whose very survival would, in fact, be at stake were it to be attacked by nuclear weapons.
Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister who ordered the preventive attack onIraq ’s
nuclear reactor in 1981, expressly renounced mutually assured destruction as a
policy. He said that Israeli “morality” would never permit a retaliatory attack
against an Iraqi city: “The children of Baghdad
are not our enemy.”
A preventive attack, on the other hand, is always directed against a military target. Only one person — a nuclear technician — was killed in the attack Begin authorized.
It would appear to be ironic that Zakaria, and others who purport to be “doves,” would favor a mutually assured destruction policy that threatens the deaths of millions, over a preventive policy that targets military nuclear facilities. But it is not at all ironic, since such doves would be against actually carrying out the threat that is central to any credible policy of deterrence. For them, deterrence is a bluff — a hollow threat and the Iranians would see right through it.
That’s why President Obama is correct in renouncing containment and insisting that he isn’t bluffing when he saysIran will not be allowed to develop
nuclear weapons, even if it takes a surgical military strike to stop them.
I am not here arguing in favor of a preventive attack onIran at this
time. I am arguing against reliance on a policy of deterrence and containment,
because I don’t believe it will work in relation to Iran ,
Israel , and the United States .
What if deterrence and containment didn’t work andIran were to fire nuclear rockets
at Israeli cities? Those who now advocate robust deterrence — of surgical
prevention — would simply say to the remaining Israelis: “Woops. We were wrong.
Sorry. We’ll build you a new Holocaust
Museum .”
Zakaria points to the fact that deterrence succeeded in preventing war between the
Let us pause for a moment to understand precisely what a policy of deterrence entails. Any such policy is based on the promise that if one side launches a nuclear attack, the other side will retaliate with an equally devastating nuclear attack, thus assuring the destruction of both societies and the deaths of millions of innocent civilians.
The first question therefore is whether the
The third question — and the one never asked by advocates of deterrence — is whether it would be legal under the laws of war to target millions of civilians in a retaliatory nuclear attack.
These are the kinds of questions that Fareed Zakaria and his dovish colleagues refuse to ask. And the reason they refuse to ask these hard questions is precisely because we know the answers they would give: They would be categorically opposed to any retaliatory attack that targeted civilians in a tit-for-tat implementation of a mutually assured destruction policy of deterrence.
If you don’t believe me, ask him!
As to the legality of nuclear deterrence, the International Court of Justice issued a decision in
These rules, of course, generally forbid the targeting of civilian population centers and require proportionality even in the bombing of military targets. Since nuclear weapons are, by their nature, virtually incapable of destroying military targets without also inflicting countless civilian casualties, it would seem to follow that they could not be used except against remote military targets, such as ships and submarines on the high seas, or armies in isolated deserts or mountains. In a divided vote, the court ruled that:
• “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict…”
• “However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.”
In other words, it would be unlawful for the United States to threaten or use nuclear weapons as a deterrent, since its “very survival” would not be at stake, but it might be lawful for Israel to do so because it is a small state whose very survival would, in fact, be at stake were it to be attacked by nuclear weapons.
Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister who ordered the preventive attack on
A preventive attack, on the other hand, is always directed against a military target. Only one person — a nuclear technician — was killed in the attack Begin authorized.
It would appear to be ironic that Zakaria, and others who purport to be “doves,” would favor a mutually assured destruction policy that threatens the deaths of millions, over a preventive policy that targets military nuclear facilities. But it is not at all ironic, since such doves would be against actually carrying out the threat that is central to any credible policy of deterrence. For them, deterrence is a bluff — a hollow threat and the Iranians would see right through it.
That’s why President Obama is correct in renouncing containment and insisting that he isn’t bluffing when he says
I am not here arguing in favor of a preventive attack on
What if deterrence and containment didn’t work and