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President Donald Trump will address US policy toward
Iran on Thursday, doubtless focusing on his decision regarding Barack Obama’s
badly-flawed nuclear deal. Key officials are now briefing Congress, the press
and foreign governments about the speech, cautioning that the final product is,
in fact, not yet final. The preponderant media speculation is that Trump’s
senior advisers are positioning him to make a serious mistake, based on their
flawed advice. Wishful thinking about Iran’s mullahs, near-religious faith in
the power of pieces of paper and a retreat from executive authority are
hallmarks of the impending crash.
In short, Obama’s Iran nuclear deal is poised to become the Trump-Obama
deal. The media report that the president will not withdraw from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but instead, under the misbegotten
Corker-Cardin legislation, will “decertify” that it is in America’s national
interest. Congress may then reimpose sanctions, or try somehow to “fix” the
deal. Curiously, most of the suggested “fixes” involve repairing Corker-Cardin
rather than the JCPOA directly.
Sure, give Congress the lead on Iran. What could go wrong? Whatever the
problem with Iran, Congress is not the answer. No president should surrender
what the Constitution vests uniquely in him: dominant power to set America’s
foreign policy. In the iconic “Federalist Number 70” essay, Alexander Hamilton
wrote insightfully that “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch” characterize
unitary executive power, and most certainly not the legislative branch.
President Trump risks not only forfeiting his leading national security role,
but paralysis, or worse, in the House and Senate.
If Congress really wants to “fix” Corker-Cardin, the best fix is total
repeal. The substantive arguments for decertifying but not withdrawing are
truly Jesuitical, teasing out imagined benefits from adhering to a deal Iran
already treats with contempt. Some argue we should try provoking Iran to exit
first, because our withdrawal would harm America’s image. This is ludicrous.
The United States must act in its own self-interest, not wait around hoping
Iran does us a favor. It won’t. Why should Tehran leave (or even modify) a deal
advantageous beyond its wildest imagination?
This “shame” prediction was made against Washington’s
2001 unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and proved
utterly false. America’s decision to abrogate the hallowed “cornerstone of
international strategic stability” produced nothing like the storm of opprobrium
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty adherents predicted. No nuclear arms race
followed. Instead, withdrawal left the United States far better positioned to
defend itself against exactly the threats Iran and others now pose.
Some say that trashing the deal will spur Iran to accelerate its nuclear
weapons program to rush across the finish line. Of course, before the JCPOA,
Iran was already party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which barred it
from seeking or possessing nuclear weapons, but which it systematically
violated. JCPOA advocates are therefore arguing that although one piece of
paper (a multilateral treaty, no less) failed to stop Iran’s nuclear quest, the
JCPOA, a second piece of paper, will do the trick, with catastrophic
consequences if we withdraw. Ironically, these same acolytes almost invariably
concede the JCPOA is badly flawed and needs substantial amendment. So they
actually believe a third piece of paper is required to halt Iran. Two are not
enough. This argument flunks the smile test: Burying Iran in paper will not
stop its nuclear program.
Iran’s ability to “rush” to have nuclear weapons existed before the deal,
exists now, and would exist if America withdrew. The director of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran said recently it would take a mere five days for
Iran to resume its pre-deal level of uranium enrichment. This rare case of
regime honesty demonstrates how trivial and easily reversible Iran’s JCPOA
concessions were. What alone deters an Iranian “rush” is the threat of preemptive
US or Israeli military strikes, not pieces of paper.
Nor will US withdrawal eliminate valuable international verification
procedures under the JCPOA. In fact, these measures are worse than useless for
nonproliferation purposes, although they serve Iran well. By affording the
appearance of effective verification, they camouflage Iran’s active, multiple
violations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231: on uranium
enrichment levels, advanced centrifuge research, heavy water production and missile
programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently admitted explicitly
it has no visibility whatever into weapons and ballistic missile work underway
on Iran’s military bases.
It is simple common sense that Iran would not conduct easily discoverable
weapons-related work at already-known nuclear sites like Natanz and Esfahan.
Warhead design and the like are far more likely at military sites like Parchin
where the IAEA has never had adequate access. No wonder the IAEA is now barred
from Parchin.
It is not just weapons-related work the JCPOA fails to uncover.
Substantial uranium enrichment production and research are also far more likely
at undeclared sites inside Iran or elsewhere, like North Korea. This is the
lesson Tehran learned after Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor under
construction by North Koreans in Syria in 2007.
Nor will abrogating the deal somehow induce Iran to become more
threatening in the Middle East or in supporting global terrorism than it
already is with the JCPOA in force. Consider Tehran’s belligerent behavior in
the Persian Gulf, its nearly successful effort to create an arc of control from
Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, threatening Israel, Jordan and the
Arabian Peninsula, and its continued role as the world’s central banker of
international terrorism. The real issue is how much worse Iran’s behavior will
be once it gets deliverable nuclear weapons.
I have previously argued that only US withdrawal from the JCPOA can
adequately protect America from the Iranian nuclear threat. Casuistry deployed
to persuade President Trump to stay in the deal may succeed this Thursday, but
it does so only at grave peril to our country. This is no time to let our guard
down.
John R. Bolton (@AmbJohnBolton) served as
US ambassador to the United Nations and as undersecretary for arms control and
international security affairs at the US Department of State under President
George W. Bush.
This article was originally published by
The Hill.