The nuclear deal reached with Iran on Tuesday is clouded
by uncertainty about whether the Iranian regime will live up to its relatively
weak commitments. One outcome is almost certain, however: Israel will launch a
pre-emptive strike against Iran, hoping to weaken the regime and stop, or slow,
its nuclear program.
Israel will
attack–possibly by year’s end–because there is no other way to disrupt
Iran’s advance to regional hegemony, which will become unstoppable once the
deal’s provisions–especially the non-nuclear provisions–begin to take effect.
Despite what the
Obama administration and its media supporters are saying, there is almost no
doubt that the Iran deal, should it survive Congress, will enable Iran to
become a nuclear power.
President Barack
Obama himself admitted as much in April, when he defended the provisional deal
signed in Lausanne by admitting it allowed Iran to reach “breakout”
shortly after the ten-year (now eight-year) expiration date. The only
question is whether Iran will move that date forward and risk the
meager diplomatic consequences of breaking the deal.
There are Israeli
analysts–a minority–who believe that Israel can live in the shadow of a
nuclear-armed Iran, at least for a while. After all, Israel has developed
a lethal “second-strike” capacity, in the form of nuclear missiles aboard Dolphin-class
submarines programmed to target Iran. That leaves the Iranian regime to
weigh the odds of surviving an Israeli counterattack versus the chances of
causing the end of the world as they know it. From a fanatical religious
perspective, it is a win-win scenario–but cooler, or less pious, heads may
prevail.
The problem is that
the Iran deal goes so much further than the nuclear issue alone. The Iranians
shrewdly bargained for a host of late concessions: an end to the international
arms embargo, the lifting of a ban on ballistic missile technology, and an
accelerated schedule of sanctions relief that will pour over $100 billion into
depleted Iranian coffers. The regime knew that Obama would not walk away–that
he had committed his political career to a deal, and he was already
dismissing all other alternatives, severely undermining his
own leverage.
Israel just might find
a way to live with a nuclear Iran, but it cannot live with a nuclear Iran and an
array of turbo-charged Iranian proxies on its borders.
Iran has already
renewed its support for Palestinian terror groups in Gaza, and the U.S. has
quietly allowed Iranian-backed Hezbollah to regroup in Lebanon, even as it has
been weakened by losses in the Syrian civil war. Flush with cash, armed with
advanced new weapons, and perhaps equipped with nuclear contaminants, these
groups will pose an ever-greater threat to Israel’s security–and soon.
That is why the
alternative that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented to
Congress–and he did present
an alternative to the present deal, though Obama pretended not to
notice–included three provisions: “first, stop its aggression against its
neighbors in the Middle East; second, stop supporting terrorism around the
world; and third, stop threatening to annihilate my country, Israel–the one and
only Jewish state.” None of those referred directly to the Iranian nuclear program.
Obama ignored Netanyahu’s suggestions and forged ahead.
An Israeli strike
might not stop the Iranian nuclear program. But it could stall that program,
and create a renewed sense of vulnerability around the regime, which was near
collapse as recently as 2009. Israel could also make Iran pay a direct cost for
arming Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terror groups–a cost historically borne by
the civilians of southern Lebanon or Gaza. It could project a conventional
deterrent that would affect Iran here and now, as opposed to a nuclear
deterrent whose effect might only be felt after an atomic exchange (i.e.
not at all).
For Israel, the
costs of such an attack on Iran–even a successful one–could be severe. It would
be condemned and isolated internationally. It might suffer thousands of rocket
attacks from Lebanon and Gaza. It may lose thousands of soldiers and civilians
in a ground war.
Obviously the
consequences will be less damaging–or more bearable–if the pre-emptive strike
is successful. The reason Israelis are willing to take the risk at all is
twofold. First, they have done it before (Iraq 1981; Syria 2007). Second, the
alternative–thanks to the Iran deal–looks far worse.
The Obama
administration has done all it can to prevent an Israeli pre-emptive strike, from
leaking Israeli attack scenarios to denying Israel air space over Iraq. As
a result, the only realistic bombing plans–whether Israel targets Iran’s
nuclear and political installations directly, or detonates an electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) over the country–involve a Doolittle Raid-style attack from
which Israel’s pilots will not expect to return, or a landing in Saudi Arabia.
The latter was once a non-starter, but–ironically–Obama’s overtures to Iran
have made it possible.
The Saudis are
expected to respond to the Iran deal by seeking nuclear weapons of their own.
But the monarchy could also strike an alliance with Israel–perhaps even a grand
bargain.
The Saudis could
give Israel landing rights, logistical support, and intelligence. In return,
Israel could accept Saudi Arabia’s proposal for a Palestinian state roughly
along the “1967 lines”–plus Saudi control of Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites,
which would cement the royal family’s legitimacy. (Ironically, Obama, by
provoking war, would enable Arab-Israeli peace.)
The clock is
ticking, however. Before the Iran deal, it was thought that Israel could only
carry out a pre-emptive strike in the time period before Iran actually became a
nuclear power. Now, the deadlines are even shorter, and more complex.
Israel would need to
attack before Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles, already sold to Iran, can
be delivered and activated. It would also need to attack while Hezbollah and
Hamas are still weak, war-weary and cash-strapped–i.e. before sanctions relief
delivers billions to Iran’s regional war and terror efforts.
Israel must also be
wary of attacking too soon. It will not attack in the next ten days, for
example, because they coincide with a religious period of mourning for
historic defeats. It would also make little sense for Israel to attack
while Congress is debating the Iran deal.
But Israel will
attack before it loses the option. It will do so because the
purpose of Israeli statehood is to enable Jews to defend themselves,
and not rely on the help or mercy of others.
Obama wants to build
a new legacy, but Netanyahu has inherited an old legacy–one he cannot
ignore.