Tehran’s goals haven’t wavered since
1979. The U.S. couldn’t even keep track of its concessions.
By L. GORDON
CROVITZ
Dealing effectively with Iran requires understanding the
differences between an Islamic theocracy and a democracy. One is a gap in
attention spans: The mullahs since their 1979 revolution have patiently built a
formidable terrorist state. Their negotiating partners are from an American
political culture that has a hard time keeping straight from week to week what
the negotiations were supposed to be about.
When the
nuclear talks began, President Obama said
the goal was to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons without the U.S. or
Israel having to use military force. Now Mr. Obama can’t imagine anyone
opposing a deal that creates a calendar for Iran getting nuclear weapons and
meanwhile provides a road map for Tehran to continue evading inspections.
Mr. Obama
last year told the New Yorker, “I don’t really even need George
Kennan right now.” He rejects long-term strategic
thinking represented by Kennan’s plan to contain the Soviet Union. Instead of a
sustained strategy, Mr. Obama has hope that Iran will change, despite the most
recent assessment by the State Department: “Iran’s state sponsorship of
terrorism worldwide remained undiminished.”
A
realistic view starts by recognizing Iran’s consistency in word and deed since
the 1979 revolution. Tehran has never wavered in its goals of getting a nuclear
bomb and exporting its Islamic revolution through groups such as Hezbollah. Its
decades of achievements range from the 1983 bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut to killing more than 1,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and now keeping Bashar
Assad in
power in Syria with the help of chemical weapons used against civilians.
Unlike
most nuclear arms-control agreements, this one does not include a baseline of
how much progress Iranians have made because they refuse to disclose it. The
deal says if there is evidence of further cheating, a committee of
countries—including Iran—will decide if an inspection is justified. If so, Iran
gets 24 days’ notice, during which it can hide the evidence.
Ben
Rhodes, Mr. Obama’s deputy national security
adviser, defended the deal last week by claiming: “We never sought in this
negotiation the capacity for so-called ‘anytime, anywhere’ where you could
basically go anywhere in the country.” In April Mr. Rhodes said: “Under this
deal, you will have anywhere, anytime 24/7 access as it relates to the
facilities that Iran has.”
Mr. Obama
was indignant at his news conference last week when a reporter asked why he
didn’t insist that Iran free four American hostages. He said hostages were a
separate topic from nuclear arms. But the U.S. gave in to many Iranian demands
that have nothing to do with centrifuges. Top among these is that the deal ends
the embargo on sales of conventional weapons to Iran. That concession came
despite the Senate testimony of Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Under no circumstances should we relieve
pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms
trafficking.” Gen. Dempsey said that July 7. The deal was announced July 14.
U.S.
negotiators couldn’t keep track of all the Iranian demands they caved in on.
Secretary of State John Kerry at first denied the
deal took Iran’s Gen. Qasem Soleimanioff the sanctions list,
but his name is in the annex to the agreement lifting sanctions. Gen. Soleimani
runs the Quds Force, Iran’s global paramilitary and covert operations group. He
is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops in Iraq.
The
mullahs have a track record of sticking to their plans, no matter what pieces
of paper they sign, but with this agreement they win even if they abide by its
terms. Richard Haass, president
of the Council on Foreign Relations, last week urged a focus on “the risk of
what will happen if Iran does comply with the agreement.” When it expires in 15
years, there will be nothing to stop Iran from activating multiple nuclear
weapons.
In the
short term, Iran will use the $150 billion it receives under the deal to
continue its mission, including buying new weapons to threaten U.S. warships in
the Persian Gulf and adding to its support of terrorists around the world.
We’ll now
see if Congress can close the attention-span gap in the 60 days it has to create
a veto-proof majority. Lawmakers should take a long-term view of the result of
legitimizing Iran as a nuclear state. History will judge their reputations in
addition to Mr. Obama’s.