by Amos Yadlin
The likely agreement between Iran and the P5+1, based on the
parameters announced by the US State Department on April 2, 2015 after the
talks in Lausanne, is problematic but not necessarily the worst case scenario
that could emerge in the context of Iran’s nuclear program. The starting point
for comparing the various scenarios is not one in which Iran has zero nuclear
capabilities, but one in which Iran has been – however illegitimately – a
nuclear threshold state since the beginning of the current decade. Iran
possesses a nuclear infrastructure it constructed over the last 10 years, i.e.,
the components and know-how to put together a nuclear bomb. Iran has 19,000
centrifuges, of which 9,000 enrich uranium, 10 tons of low grade enriched uranium
(enough fissile material for 7-8 bombs after enrichment to a higher grade), two
underground enrichment facilities, a power reactor in Bushehr also capable of
producing plutonium, a heavy water plutonium reactor under construction in
Arak, and an infrastructure of know-how, R&D, and covert activity dedicated
to weapons development. The emerging agreement does not permit Iran to develop
nuclear weapons, neither in 10-25 years, nor thereafter. An Iranian decision to
develop nuclear weapons in 2025 or 2030, when most restrictions imposed by the
agreement are scheduled to be lifted, would still represent a violation of the
agreement and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, obligating a forceful
international response.
 |
| Secretary of State Kerry with P5+1 leaders and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, Lausanne, April 2, 2015 |
Israel views Iran with nuclear weapons as a threat to its
security of the highest order, if not an outright existential threat. Already
today, before an agreement between Iran and the world powers has been signed,
Iran is only 2-3 months away from the bomb, should it decide to break out to
nuclear weapons. Therefore, an acceptable agreement with Iran would have to
keep it at least 2-3 years away from the bomb. It thus behooves Israeli policy
to focus, first and foremost, on improving the parameters of the emerging
agreement. At the same time, Israel must work with the United States to promote
agreements and a coordinated plan of action, and perhaps also to anchor
understandings in a formal agreement that would provide solutions to the
problematic scenarios and dangers inherent in an Iranian breakout, with or
without a final agreement. In particular, Israel must strive to receive guarantees
that there will be suitable solutions to the risks that an agreement with Iran
poses to it, and to reach an agreement with the United States about
strengthening Israel’s security and political standing in case the optimistic
scenario envisioned by the US administration does not materialize.
An analytical model to guide the respective leaders of the
United States and Israel – leaders who view Iran armed with nuclear bombs as
unacceptable – is one that focuses on the question that must be asked at every
point in time: have we reached “the junction” where we must choose between two
problematic alternatives, each replete with negative outcomes and appalling
ramifications – accepting Iran with nuclear arms or taking military action to
prevent Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons? If we believe that we
have not yet reached such a decision making junction and that there are
alternatives that can keep Iran from producing nuclear weapons that are neither
“the bomb” nor “bombardment,” they are to be preferred. Such alternatives could
take the form of a reasonable agreement, extreme sanctions that would change
the balance of Iran’s calculus, secret activity against the Iranian nuclear
program, or regime change in Tehran.
I believe that if Prime Minister Netanyahu determines we are at
the point where a decision must be made on accepting a military nuclear Iran or
stopping it using military force, he would do what it takes to stop Iran
militarily. I also assume that if President Obama or any other subsequent US
president realizes that the Iranians are in fact breaking out to the bomb, he
or she will stand behind Obama’s promise to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear
weapons and prefer “prevention” over “containment.” However, United States
enthusiasm for reaching an agreement has severely weakened the administration’s
position in the negotiations, and therefore this second assumption must be
validated. The reasoning used by administration spokespeople to justify the
interim agreement signed with Iran and the parameters for the final agreement
that were made public greatly eroded the US commitment whereby “all options are
on the table.” Based on their statements, it was possible to understand that if
the administration assessed it was at the crucial junction, there would be
little likelihood it would choose to bomb Iran rather than see Iran with the
bomb.
Below are six scenarios. Three assume a failure to reach an
agreement by the target date of June 30, 2015, and three assume an agreement is
reached. For each of the six scenarios, the essay describes different projected
Iranian conduct, with the understanding that this is the most difficult
variable to predict. For every scenario, the essay attempts to analyze the
circumstances whereby the difficult junction of the “the bomb” or “to bomb”
decision is reached, and the extent to which each of the scenarios is either
preferable or less desirable than the current situation in which Iran already
possesses nuclear threshold capabilities. The analysis assumes that an
agreement will include all the parameters made public by the State Department,
with requisite improvements in limiting nuclear R&D in Iran and with the
addition of full transparency regarding the nuclear program’s military
dimensions, as well as full verification of Iranian nuclear conduct at every
site and at any time, as stipulated by the agreement.
The
Talks Fail
Scenario 1: The interim agreement de facto becomes the permanent
agreement. The failure to reach a final agreement would
stem from the gaps between the sides in their interpretations of the Lausanne
parameters. An Iranian insistence on the immediate lifting of the sanctions,
limited supervision, continued aggressive R&D, and the refusal to provide
satisfactory answers to questions about the military dimensions of the nuclear
program would necessarily lead to a breakdown of the talks. Nonetheless, the
underlying assumption of this scenario is that both sides would be careful not
to create a profound crisis and would declare their commitment to the spirit of
the interim agreement – the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) concluded in November
2013 and implemented in January 2014 – while continuing the talks in some
format or another. In practice, the interim agreement would evolve into a
permanent agreement. In this situation, Iran would be closer to the bomb (2-3
months away) than in an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters (1 year away
from the bomb for the first 10 years after the agreement is signed); there
would be no restrictions on developing advanced centrifuges and operating them;
and there would be no restrictions on the construction of additional reactors.
Supervision would be partial and not involve implementation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. The key question in this scenario
is Iran’s ability to function under the existing sanctions regime, i.e., to
continue to pay the price of the sanctions. This scenario could be realized
only if the US Congress adopts a moderate approach when it comes to legislating
further sanctions and if the Iranians decide they can continue to absorb the
burden of the current sanctions while hoping that as time passes, they can
bypass them and/or the current sanctions regime will dissolve.
The Israeli government must ask itself if this scenario is
preferable to an agreement. If it is assessed that Iran can preserve its
nuclear program given the current sanctions, this scenario is more problematic
than an agreement. While Iranian nuclear activity will not be granted
legitimacy and the sanctions imposed on it will not be lifted so that the
Iranians will not receive more resources for their negative Middle East
activity, the fact is that an illegitimate Iran under sanctions still managed
to develop a much more extensive and dangerous infrastructure than Iran will
have under the Lausanne agreement parameters. Moreover, it is doubtful that in
this scenario, the US administration would feel it had arrived at “the junction”;
it is doubtful it would increase pressure on Iran or take military action
against it. Even though the Israeli government initially denounced the interim
agreement in 2013, by the following year it readily accepted extension of the
agreement and continued talks with the Iranians, given the more problematic
alternatives such as resumed Iranian progress toward the bomb or a bad
agreement. Thus technically speaking and in terms of the breadth and depth of
the Iranian nuclear program, an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters is
better than the interim agreement becoming the de facto permanent agreement. If
the JPOA remains in force, the Iranians will be left with a significant reserve
of 10 tons of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent, as well as 19,000 centrifuges,
which means a very short breakout time. The only strategic rationale for
preferring this alternative would be an assessment that the current sanctions
will continue to hurt Iran so much that it will be forced to accept even more
restrictive parameters of their nuclear program.
Scenario 2: The
talks fail while Iran withdraws from the JPOA and expands its nuclear
infrastructure though still without breaking out to the bomb.
In this scenario, Iran ends its commitment to the interim agreement and renews the
full scope of expanding and improving its nuclear program but still without
denying its commitment to the NPT. Iran would operate advanced centrifuges,
enlarge its stockpile of enriched material, resume enrichment to the 20 percent
grade, not implement the Additional Protocol, and begin operating the heavy
water reactor in Arak. As a result, its breakout time would be reduced to zero
as early as 2016, rather than 2028 as estimated by President Obama in his
interview with National Public Radio. Such conduct on Iran’s part would most
assuredly lead to harsher sanctions on Iran, but it is safe to assume that the
President would still not define this moment as “the junction” for making the
fateful decision. The US administration has already demonstrated that it can
live with extensive Iranian nuclear capabilities as long as in practice the
Iranians do not break out toward the bomb. For Israel, which has determined it
cannot live with an Iran capable of breaking out to the bomb on short notice,
this would be a very problematic scenario and would support the assessment that
Israel was already at the decision making junction. This scenario would appear
to be more problematic for Israel than a formulation of an agreement based on
the Lausanne parameters (with the requisite amendments). In any case, before
taking action, Israel would have to consider the effectiveness of the added
sanctions that would be imposed on Iran, their chances of bringing Iran back to
the negotiating table, and the prospects for generating a better agreement in
those renewed talks.
Scenario 3: The
talks fail and Iran decides to break out to the bomb, to withdraw from the NPT,
and/or to work covertly to attain the bomb. In response to the
failure to reach an agreement and to the subsequent harsher sanctions, Iran
would announce its withdrawal from the NPT and/or decide to produce nuclear
weapons. One may assume the Iranians would justify this step by claiming that
nuclear weapons are their only way to ensure Iranian security and that as a rising
world power it is their right to have the same weapons possessed by the world
powers and other nations in Iran’s vicinity. This is a severe crisis scenario
that would immediately position both the United States and Israel at the
decision making “junction.” Judging whether this scenario is preferable to an
agreement would depend on a comparison between future outcomes of an agreement
with Iran on the one hand (see the next three scenarios), and the effectiveness
and outcomes of an attack that would be carried out to block Iran’s access to
the bomb, on the other.
The
Talks End in an Agreement
Scenario 4: The
negotiations conclude on the basis of the Lausanne parameters, a positive
dynamic develops between Iran and the world powers, and over the next 10-15
years Iran grows more moderate and stops working toward nuclear weapons.
This is the optimistic scenario that the US administration hopes will
materialize. In this scenario, Iran would gradually be welcomed back into the
fold of the family of nations and would uphold the letter and the spirit of the
agreement it made with the world powers, on the basis of an understanding that
nuclear weapons are not an asset but a burden. Although Iran, even after a
decade, would remain just one year away from the bomb, the tracks to a nuclear
bomb – the uranium track, the plutonium track, and the covert track – would be
blocked and tightly supervised. In this scenario, Iran could, after 10 years,
expand its nuclear infrastructure in Natanz, but according to the agreement
would not enrich to a grade above 3.67 percent, would not amass materials above
a negligible amount of 300 kg, would not operate the Fordow enrichment site,
and would persuade the international community it was a nation with civilian
nuclear capabilities maintaining the principles of the NPT and effectively
supervised by the IAEA’s expanded Additional Protocol.
If the world powers were also capable of preventing nuclear
proliferation in other Middle East nations, this scenario is undoubtedly
preferable to the current state of affairs in which Iran is already only a few
months away from the bomb, and certainly to a situation in which it will have a
much expanded nuclear infrastructure in 2030 without an agreement. This
scenario would relieve the necessity of choosing among two bad alternatives –
“the bomb” or “bombardment” – at the fateful decision making junction.
Scenario 5: Iran
keeps the agreement but does not concede its strategic objective, namely,
having the ability to develop the bomb at any given time and on as short notice
as possible. The underlying assumption of this scenario is that
there will be no change in the regime and that Iran, in addition to continuing
its negative activities in the Middle East (striving for regional hegemony,
being involved in subversion, supporting terrorism, and working to destroy
Israel), will also cling to the desire to be able to decide, at a moment’s
notice, to develop a nuclear bomb without the world being able to do anything
about it. At the end of the 10 years of restrictions imposed by the agreement,
Iran reassembles – legitimately, according to the agreement – all 13,000
centrifuges dismantled by the agreement, and sets a goal of achieving 54,000
centrifuges (including advanced models) – the full capacity of the Natanz
facility – by year 15 of the agreement. In this scenario, Iran installs the
thousands of advanced centrifuges it has developed during the years of the
agreement, and prepares 3,000 advanced centrifuges in Fordow in year 15 of the
agreement, which allows it to return to full activity in this well-fortified
site. In year 15 of the agreement, Iran can also start amassing enriched
material above the 300 kg limit and increase the grade of enrichment to 20
percent. It is clear that exactly as President Obama predicted in his NPR
interview, the breakout time would be very close to zero already in year 13
year of the agreement, and certainly by year 15. In 2025, the Israeli Prime
Minister and the US President would undoubtedly be much closer to “the junction”
and would have to decide whether or not to act before the scope and immunity of
the Iranian nuclear program would leave the decision on the development of
nuclear arms solely in the hands of a problematic, hostile Iranian regime. The
decision to act would be difficult because the Iranians would not have deviated
from the agreement, while at the same time it would be clear that non-action on
the part of the world powers would mean an Iranian bomb in virtually no time at
all and at a time considered optimal from the regime’s point of view.
The most important question is: will the United States, hopeful
that the optimistic fourth scenario is realized but in reality encountering the
problematic fifth scenario, be capable of acting against Iran without Iran
having violated the agreement and before it has gone the last mile to the bomb,
i.e., activity focused on high grade enrichment and the development of bomb
delivery systems? By contrast, Israel would presumably be free to act because
it is not a party to the agreement. Moreover, counter-intuitively, in this
scenario military action against the Iranian nuclear program in 2025 would in
all probability not be much more complicated or difficult than in 2015. Before
the Iranian nuclear infrastructure is expanded over the duration of the
agreement, between 2025 and 2027, the Iranian program will be reduced compared
to what it is today, intelligence about it will be better, and it will be less
immune than it is at present. On the other hand, in another 10-12 years, it may
be that the Iranians will have developed new aerial defense systems and
additional fortifications that would pose a challenge to an Israeli military
operation.
Scenario 6: Iran
operates covertly in violation of the agreement, whittles away at it, and in
the extreme case breaks out toward the bomb. In this scenario,
either before or after the end of the agreement, the Iranians are caught
cheating, acting in violation of their commitment to the NPT or the dictates of
the agreement, and working toward achieving the bomb. Developing weapon systems
and/or enriching to a high grade could be carried out either overtly or
covertly. In such a case, it would seem that both Israel and the United States
would find themselves at the decision making “junction,” i.e., either
acquiescing to Iran armed with nuclear weapons or taking counter-action. If
both nations cling to their mantra that all options are on the table and that
they will not allow Iran to have the bomb, it is clear that this scenario
offers them the legitimacy to act in virtually any situation before 2027 (the
earliest by which Iran is expected to return to its 2015 capabilities). Again,
the military mission would not be more complex than it is in 2015; perhaps the
opposite would be the case: the Iranian program would be more exposed and less
extensive than it is now, and the Israeli and US intelligence and offensive
capabilities would be better than they are at present.
Conclusion
The six scenarios analyzed here indicate that an agreement
between the world powers and Iran on the Iranian nuclear program based on the
Lausanne parameters with necessary improvements (a detailed addition to refer
to R&D, responses to the weapons aspects of the program, and supervision of
every site at any time) is preferable to the current situation, even if it is
not “a good deal.” The alternative to the improved Lausanne agreement would
consist of severe and effective sanctions that may possibly result in a better
agreement but might also lead to the realization of the dangers inherent in a
failure of the talks, Iran’s continued nuclear activity, and even a decision by
the Tehran regime to break out to the bomb. By contrast, an agreement would
make it possible in another 10-12 years to gauge whether the Iranian regime has
become more moderate or has stayed exactly the same and is still vying for
nuclear arms. If that happens, it would be possible to take action against the
nuclear program under improved operational conditions and possibly also under
conditions of enhanced legitimacy. Perhaps the possibility of a special defense
agreement between Israel and the United States should be investigated, one that
would be limited to the Iranian nuclear issue alone, thereby bypassing the
obstacles preventing the signing of a comprehensive defense agreement between
the two countries.
In case an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters is
achieved, the worst scenario is not necessarily the one in which Iran violates
the agreement or breaks out toward the bomb, but rather the one in which Iran
maintains the letter of the agreement and does not provide the United States
with a legitimate reason for preventing Iran from being zero time away from a
bomb, backed by a large, advanced, and immune nuclear program. In that
scenario, only the Israeli government, which is not a party to the agreement,
would be at the difficult decision making juncture – the same crossroads it is
at today unless an agreement is reached.
That said, Israel is running out of time to formulate a strategy
until either an agreement is signed or the talks end in failure. Therefore, it
is recommended that the Prime Minister discuss the strategy of action required
by each of the scenarios analyzed above, and urgently formulate a corollary
agreement with the United States that would include understandings for each of
the scenarios. These understandings would have to relate to the clarifications
required for the Lausanne parameters as well as a promise that there would be
no further concessions to Iranian demands, as was hinted at after the public
presentation of the document of principles formulated in Lausanne. Other topics
requiring clarification and policy formulation are how to deal with Iran’s negative
non-nuclear activity of and how future demands for other nuclear programs in
Middle East states would be handled, restricted, and supervised. Such demands
are another strategic danger that will develop if an agreement with Iran, based
on the parameters of the Lausanne declaration, is signed.
The scenarios analyzed in this essay can serve as the foundation
for a comprehensive, professional strategic discussion that should be held now
between Israel and the United States. Analyzing the complex ramifications, as
detailed above, should allow the formulation of the required components of a
final future agreement and the construction of the bilateral strategy most
appropriate to the problematic scenarios and crisis situations. These difficult
situations are highly likely to develop after an agreement is reached between
the world powers and Iran in various contexts of the Iranian nuclear
program.
Amos
Yadlin is wrong. Even with the necessary amendments if they fall short of what Yuval
Steinitz listed here, the 6
alternatives presented by Yadlin look pretty bad in all cases. Either the assumptions are wishful thinking and wrong or they are simply bad since the choice is between immediate action against Iran or a nuclear Iran.
-- no agreement, scenarios 1,2 3
scenario 1
"the underlying assumption of this scenario is that both sides would
be careful not to create a profound crisis and would declare their commitment
to the spirit of the interim agreement" -- nonsense
scenario 2
"Israel would have to consider the effectiveness of the added
sanctions that would be imposed on Iran, their chances of bringing Iran
back to the negotiating table, and the prospects for generating a better
agreement in those renewed talks." nonsense
scenario 3
this is a severe crisis scenario that would immediately position
both the United States and Israel at the decision making “junction.”
-- agreement, scenarios 4,5,6
scenario 4,
the one US hopes will happen " Iran grows more moderate and stops working toward nuclear weapons." nonsense
scenario 5
"The breakout time would be very close to zero already in year 13
year of the agreement, and certainly by year 15.
The most important question is: will the United States, hopeful
that the optimistic fourth scenario is realized but in reality encountering the
problematic fifth scenario, be capable of acting against Iran without Iran
having violated the agreement and before it has gone the last mile to the
bomb " Obama would do nothing
scenario 6
"it would seem that both Israel and the United States would find
themselves at the decision making “junction,” i.e., either acquiescing
to Iran armed with nuclear weapons or taking counter-action." I
do not think that Obama would lift a finger even here
Amos Yadlin desperately needs some education on Islam. I
would suggest Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s book Heretic