Mainstream media outlets have
been flooded with analysis and articles predominantly from Western scholars,
professors and policy analysts discussing the reaction from Iran’s domestic
political establishment and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei to the recent
nuclear deal.
Having lived in the Islamic Republic for over a decade under
both the so-called “moderate”and “hardline” governments and having studied Iran
for many years, I never cease to be surprised by the mainstream media and many
of Western writers’ view of Iran’s politics.
The main narrative being circulated on the media involves the various responses
from Iranian politicians: The moderates, hardliners, principlists and the
Supreme Leader. The analyses and opinions center on the premise of “this
group vs. that group,” in other words, moderates versus hardliners, the Supreme
Leader vs. moderates.
For many of Western writers and politicians, this is a natural
way to view and interpret Iran’s political system. Because this is how the
politics of Western democracies are often characterized: Democrats vs.
Republicans, capitalists vs. socialists, etc.
Hence, it is very challenging for these writers, scholars,
politicians and policy analysts to view things outside of this framework and
prism.
Domestically speaking, I, like the majority of people who lived
in the Islamic Republic, never noticed social, political, economic, or legal
differences under either “moderate” or “hardline” governments. The political
suppression was the same.
Human rights abuses, stripping people of their basic universal
human rights (freedom of religion, speech, assembly, press) were the same under
various political parties, and have deteriorated since the Islamic Republic
came to power in 1979.
Whether under Rouhani’s rule, Ahmadinejad’s, Khatami’s, or
Rafsanjani’s rule, discrimination against women, subjugation of women,
suppression and killings of dissidents, persecuting religious minorities
persisted and increased.
Similarly, when it comes to the actual implementation of the
Islamic Republic’s regional and foreign policy, there exists no difference
between the so-called “moderate,” “hardliners,” “principlists,” or different
Supreme Leaders.
Instead of analyzing Iran’s nuclear dossier and its regional
policy based on the aforementioned categorizations (which reflects a Western
mindset rather than the reality on the ground in the Islamic Republic), I
actually divide these groups into what I call the “real” face of Iranian
politics and the “deceptive,” soft face that serves the political establishment
and the theocratic regime.
The real face of the Islamic Republic (the Supreme Leader, Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard Corps, Quds Forces, Basij, etc.) are those whom the West calls
“hardliners.” They are clear about their goals and objectives. They desire to
pursue interventionist and aggressive foreign policy in the region. They are
vocal about matters such as their anti-American, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western
sentiments. They state that they would like to wipe Israel off of the
map, that they would like to spread their version of Islam across the region
and beyond.
On the other hand, the deceptive, soft face of the regime is
represented by those who are depicted as the “moderates.” Many of the
politicians in this camp, who have smiles on their faces, are Western- or
US-educated (such as Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif, who recovered
his PhD from Josef Korbel School of International Studies in Denver), and they
have learned how to manipulate the West’s language and diplomacy in order
to fool the US and other powers.
It is worth noting that the underlying objective of all these
different camps is not undermining each group as the mainstream media depict.
The main goal is to preserve the power of the Supreme Leader and the underlying
foundations of the Islamic Republic.
The Iranian leaders learned a crucial lesson under the former
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that if they employ their real aggressive
face on international arenas and in nuclear talks, they will be hit by more
sanctions that will endanger the hold-on-power of the Supreme Leader and the
political establishment. As a result, the creation of “moderate” narratives was
crucial to preserve the ruling clerics and the mullahs. By creating this
narrative, they became fully capable of preventing the West from understanding
the reality of Iran’s political system.
There is no real binary such as moderate vs. hardliners, or the
Supreme Leader vs. moderates. There is only the interests of the Supreme
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the underlying foundation of the Islamic
Republic.
About Majid Rafizadeh
Majid
Rafizadeh, an Iranian-American political scientist and scholar, is
president of the International American Council and serves on the board of the
Harvard International Review at Harvard University. Rafizadeh is also a former
senior fellow at the Nonviolence International Organization based in
Washington, DC and is a member of the Gulf project at Columbia University. He
can be reached at rafizadeh@fas.harvard.edu.
Follow Rafizadeh at @majidrafizadeh.